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PETER N. DAVIS*
Protecting Waste Assimilation
Streamflows by the Law of Water
Allocation, Nuisance, and Public
Trust, and by Environmental Statutes
ABSTRACT
Both federal and state water pollution control statutes require
dramatic reductions in waste discharges, but not their total elimi-
nation. Those statutes require establishing water quality standards
for receiving waters and presume that they will be adequate to assim-
ilate the residual post-treatment wastes. But nothing in those statutes
assures that minimum flows for waste assimilation in fact will remain
in existence. Neither the common law nor eastern and western diver-
sion permit statutes expressly provide direct means for establishing
such minimum flows. Indirect means do exist, however, for estab-
lishing minimum protected flows for residual waste assimilation.
Those means include establishing minimum flowsforfish and wildlife
habitat and recreation purposes in some eastern diversion permit
states, authorizing appropriations for the same purposes in some
western states, and requiring protection of environmental values in
those states that recognize the public trust or have enacted environ-
mental protection statutes. Because of the haphazard and inadequate
characteristics of those indirect means, states should establish direct
regulatory authority for establishing minimum protected streamflows
for waste assimilation.
INTRODUCTION
Current primary and secondary waste treatment technologies do not
yield completely clean water. "The standard measure for treatment effec-
tiveness is biological oxygen demand (BOD); secondary treatment typi-
cally removes 90 percent of the BOD, leaving the remainder to be treated
by natural processes in the receiving stream. '"' In addition, waste treat-
ment yields a large load of inorganic compounds which fertilize the
*lsidor Loeb Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia. B.A. 1959, Haverford; LL.B.
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I. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, FIRST ANNUAL ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REPORT 35
(1970) [hereinafter CEQ 1970 ANNUAL REPORT); COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, SEVENTH
ANNUAL REPORT 257-58 (1976) [hereinafter CEQ 1976 ANNUAL ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY REPORT];
NATIONAL WATER COMM'N, WATER POLICIES FOR THE FUTURE 307 (1973); I F GRAD, TREATISE ON
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 3.0111 [b] (1973).
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receiving waters and induce growth of aquatic vegetation.' Those residual
wastes and compounds, and the by-products of the growth and death
cycle of aquatic vegetation, are assimilated by the receiving waters.3 To
enable the natural processes of assimilation to take place without depleting
too much oxygen from the water, a minimum quantity of flow must be
left in the stream.4 The quantity needed for assimilation depends on the
waste discharge load.
Diversion of water for irrigation, manufacturing, and public water
supply can reduce the flow available to an amount less than the minimum
required for natural waste assimilative processes. Unless the volume and
concentration of treated and untreated waste discharges can be reduced
or the streamflow increased, the wastes will overwhelm the assimilative
processes of the stream. That process will result in insufficient or zero
oxygen levels in the water, fish kills and odors.5 An appropriate balance
between streamflow and waste discharges is essential to a healthy stream.
Water Pollution Control Statutes
The federal Clean Water Act regulates waste discharges from "point
sources"6 into "waters of the United States." 7 The latter term has been
interpreted to encompass virtually any free-flowing watercourse, and is
not limited to waters subject to the federal navigation power.' State water
pollution control statutes generally regulate waste discharges into the same
universe of watercourses, and many, in addition, regulate discharges into
groundwater."
2. CEQ 1970 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note I, at 36, 40-41; NATIONAL WATER COMM'N, supra
note I, at 64-65, 307.
3. A. KNEESE & B. BOWER, MANAGING WATER QUALITY: ECONOMICS, TECHNOLOGY, INSTITUTIONS
16-17 (1968); CEQ 1970 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 1, at 35; Beck & Goplerud, Water Pollution
and Water Quality: Legal Controls, in 3 WATERS & WATER RIGHTS § 202.3 (R. Clark 2d ed. 1984 &
Supp. 1985).
4. A. KNEESE & B. BOWER, supra note 3, at 19-27; CEQ 1970 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note I, at
40-41; Beck & Goplerud, supra note 3, at 7-8; F. GRAD, supra note I, §3.01[I][b].
5. BOUGHEY, MAN AND THE ENVIRONMENT 345-49 (1971); A. KNEESE & B. BOWER, supra note 3,
at 19-27; Edmondson, Fresh Water Pollution, in ENVIRONMENT: RESOURCES, POLLUTION & SOCIETY
252-57 (W. Murdock ed. 1971); CEQ 1970 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note I, at 30-31, 40-41 ; Beck
& Goplerud, supra note 3, at 7-8; GRAD, supra note 1, §3.01[Il[b].
6. Clean Water Act §§ 502(12), (14), 33 U.S.C. §§ 1362(12), (14) (1982); United States v. Earth
Sciences, Inc., 599 F.2d 368, 373 (10th Cir. 1979). See generally, Beck & Goplerud, supra note
3, at 88-92; S. NOVICK, D. STEVER & M. MELLON, LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 12-49 to -
50 (1987).
7. Clean Water Act § 502(7), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (1982).
8. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S, 121 (1985); United States v. Ashland
Oil & Transp. Co., 504 F.2d 1317 (6th Cir. 1974); P.FZ Properties, Inc. v. Train, 393 F.Supp.
1370 (D.D.C. 1975). See generally, Beck & Goplerud, supra note 3, at 71-82; S. NOVICK, D,
STEVER & M. MELLON, supra note 6, at 12-48 to -49.
9. The state water pollution control statutes exist in all 50 states and are too numerous to cite in
this portion of the article.
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Federal and state statutory regulation of waste discharges is grounded
on a system of discharge permits, national treatment performance stan-
dards, and water quality standards for receiving waters. The Clean Water
Act emphasizes the technological approach rather than the water quality
approach to regulation. Hence, waste dischargers are expected to accom-
plish mandated waste reductions based on technological ability rather
than to achieve or maintain predetermined water quality characteristics
in receiving waters.'"
Under both federal and state water pollution control statutes, waste
dischargers are required to obtain discharge permits." Individualized effluent
limitations are imposed by each waste discharge permit. '2Those effluent
limitations must reflect achievement of the "best practicable control tech-
nology currently available" mandated for 1977, " and progress toward
"best available technology economically achievable" mandated for 1989."4
At a minimum, all waste dischargers must treat their wastes at least to
the levels specified by the national performance standards.' Individual-
ized effluent limitations may reflect those uniform minimums, or may
incorporate more stringent treatment requirements based on peculiarities
of the permittee's waste effluent, more stringent state treatment policies
and requirements, or the characteristics of the receiving waters.' 6
Role of Water Quality Standards
In the late 1960s, states were required to establish water quality stan-
dards for receiving waters.' Today, they are required to update them
periodically. ' Those standards reflect designations made by the states for
10. See generally, Beck & Goplerud, supra note 3, at 231-33; 2 S. NOVIcK, D. STEVER & M.
MELLON, supra note 6, at 12-10 to -I1, 12-18 to -19.
11. Clean Water Act §§301(a); 402(a); 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1342(a) (1982). See generally,
Beck & Goplerud, supra note 3, at 134-39; S. NOVICK, D. STEVER & M. MELLON, supra note 6, at
12-59 to -63.
12. Clean Water Act §§301(b), (e), 304(b), 33 U.S.C. §§ 131 l(b), (e), 1314(b) (1982).
13. Clean Water Act § 301(b)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 131 l(b)(1) (1982). See generally, Beck & Goplerud,
supra note 3, at 92-105; S. NOVICK, D. STEVER & M. MELLON, supra note 6, at 12-68 to -76.
14. Clean Water Act §301(b)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 131 l(b)(2) (1982), as amended in 1987 by P.L.
No. 100-04, § 301(c)-(d), 101 Stat. 29 (1987). See generally, Beck & Goplerud, supra note 3, at
105-06; S. NOVICK, D. STEVER & M. MELLON, supra note 6, at 12-76 to -92.
15. Clean Water Act §§ 304(e), 306, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1314(e), 1316 (1982). See generally, Beck &
Goplerud, supra note 3, at 106; S. NovIcK, D. STEVER & M. MELLON, supra note 6, at 12-96 to -
100.
16. Clean Water Act § 302, 33 U.S.C. § 1312 (1982). See generally, Beck & Goplemd, supra
note 3, at 233.
17. Clean Water Act §303, 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (1982). See generally, Beck & Goplerud, supra
note 3, at 183-94; S. NovIcK, D. STEVER & M. MELLON, supra note 6, at 12-103 to - 10.
18. Clean Water Act §303(e) (amended by P.L. No. 97-117, §24, 95 Stat. 1632 (1981), 33
U.S.C. §§ 1313(e), 1313(a) (1982).
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use of various reaches of watercourses, such as aquatic habitat, public
water supply, water contact sports, industrial water supply, or waste
assimilation. They also reflect, subject to federal minimum standards,
the appropriate characteristics of water for those uses. The water quality
standards are used as benchmarks for measuring the effectiveness of water
pollution control regulation. Whenever the effluent limitations in a dis-
charge permit prove to be insufficient for achieving the applicable water
quality standard along a reach of a river, the treatment requirements in
that permit can be tightened. 9
The water quality standards and the effluent limitations in each permit
presume a minimum flow for waste assimilation in the receiving water-
course. If that minimum flow is encroached upon by diversions, the water
quality standards will become unachievable because the assimilative capacity
of the watercourse will be reduced below the presumed amount. Such
diversions threaten the integrity of the water pollution control program
and may cause a degradation in water quality for instream and downstream
water users.
Legislation Does Not Protect Assimilative Flows
The federal Clean Water Act does not provide any mechanism for
protecting minimum streamflows for waste assimilation capacity. This is
true even though the fundamental regulatory philosophy expects that such
minimum flows will exist and will be maintained. State water pollution
control statutes also do not provide such protection. Furthermore, there
are no federal or state regulations establishing or protecting minimum
assimilative flows.
This article examines various ways in which federal and state water
pollution and water use control agencies, individual waste dischargers,
and water users might protect minimum flows for waste assimilation. It
also examines the rights of water users to protect their water supplies
from interfering waste discharges. The legal interrelationship between
water uses and wastes discharges is governed by federal and state water
pollution control statutes, state water diversion permit statutes, the com-
mon law of nuisance, the public trust doctrine, and environmental pro-
tection statutes. That interrelationship also is affected by the differing
water allocation laws of the eastern and western states.
LAW OF WATER ALLOCATION
The law of water allocation affects the relationship between water uses
and waste discharges. The systems of water allocation in the United States
are divided into two great groups. The eastern states adopted the riparian
19. Clean Water Act § 302.33 U.S.C. § 1312 (1982).
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doctrine in the first half of the nineteenth century. Today, about half of
them have enacted diversion permit statutes to supplant riparian rights.
By contrast, the western states adopted the prior appropriation system by
case decision in the second half of the nineteenth century. Today, they
enforce the prior appropriation system through diversion permit statutes.
Both the eastern doctrine of riparian rights and the western doctrine of
prior appropriation emphasize water quantity allocation, but also address
water quality rights.
Eastern States
Riparian Rights
In most of the thirty-one eastern states, the right to use water is governed
by the riparian doctrine. The American "reasonable use" version was
first formulated in 1827 in the landmark decision of Tyler v. Wilkinson.'
It spread rapidly throughout the eastern states,2 to some western states,
22
20. 24 F.Cas. 472 (C.C.D.R.I. 1827) (No. 14,312).
While the English cases cited by Circuit Justice Story in Tyler contain some small elements of
the riparian doctrine, such as Wright v. Howard, I Sim. & St. 190, 57 Eng. Rep. 76 (1823), the
principal influences appear to be the cited early American cases. The New York cases appear to
have been particularly influential: Palmer v. Mulligan, 3 Cai. R. 308 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805); Platt v.
Johnson, 15 Johns. 213 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1818); Merritt v. Brinkerhoff, 17 Johns. 306 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1820). On the pre-Tvler English cases, see Lauer, The Common Law Background of the Riparian
Doctrine, 28 Mo. L. REV. 60 (1963); Murphy, English Water Law Doctrines Before 1400, I AM.
J. LEGAL HIST. 103 (1957).
On the historical origins of the riparian doctrine generally, and the controversy between the
proponents of a common law origin and a civil law origin, see Davis, The Right to Use Water in
the Eastern States, in 7 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 27, 28-35 (R. Clark ed. 1976, Supp. 1978);
Maass & Zobel, Anglo-American Water Law: Who Appropriated the Riparian Doctrine?, 10 PUB.
POLICY 109 (1961) (Yearbook of Grad. Sch. Pub. Admin., Harv. Univ.); Wiel, Waters: American
Law and French Authority, 33 HARV. L. REV. 133 (1919); Wiel, Origin and Comparative Devel-
opment of the Law of Watercourses in the Common Law and in the Civil Law, 6 CALIF. L. REV.
245 (1918); S. WIEL, WATER RIGHTS IN THE WESTERN STATES 30-36 (3d ed. 1911).
21. Tyler and the riparian doctrine were described the very next year in the extremely influential
writings of Chancellor James Kent and Joseph Angell. 3 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES 353-55 (1st ed.
1828); J. ANGELL, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF WATERCOURSES (2d ed. 1832). Early American riparian
rights cases include: Stein v. Burden, 29 Ala. 127 (1856); Evans v. Merriweather, 4 III. (3 Scam.)
492 (1842); Dilling v. Murray, 6 Ind. 324 (1855); Blanchard v. Baker, 8 Me. 253 (1832); Elliott v.
Fitchburg R.R. Co., 64 Mass. (10 Cush.) 191 (1852); Hayes v. Waldron, 44 N.H. 580 (1863);
Crooker v. Bragg, 10 Wend. 260 (N.Y. 1833); Howell v. M'Coy, 3 Rawle 256 (Pa. 1832).
In the eastern United States, Louisiana, a civil law state, was the only holdout. Its water allocation
law was based on its version of the Code Napoleon. See La. Civil Code of 1808, art. 8, at 128
(copying Code Napoleon of 1804, art. 644); Martin v. Jett, 12 La. 501 (1838), which adopted a
natural flow servitude. See generally, M. BORTON & H. ELLIS, SOME LEGAL ASPECTS OF WATER USE
IN LOUISIANA (La. St. Univ. Agric. Expt. Sta. Bull. No. 537, June 1960); F. TRELEASE & G. GOULD,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON WATER LAW 311-13 (4th ed. 1986).
22. Ferrea v. Knipe, 28 Cal. 341 (1865); Lux v. Haggin, 69 Cal. 255, 4 P. 919 (1884). 10 P.
674 (1886); Sturr v. Beck, 6 Dak. Terr. 71, 50 N.W. 486 (1888), affrd, 133 U.S. 541 (1890);
Vansickle v. Haines, 7 Nev. 249 (1872); Haas v. Choussard, 17 Tex. 588 (1856). See generally, I
W. HUTCHINS, WATER RIGHTS LAWS IN THE NINETEEN WESTERN STATES 180-81, 186-92 (1971).
Abolition of the riparian doctrine in some of those western states and limitation of riparian rights
in others is discussed in id. at 200-25.
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and throughout the English-speaking world. 23 Until 25 years ago, it dom-
inated the eastern states. Only since then have some eastern state sup-
planted the riparian doctrine with statutory permit systems.24
The riparian doctrine grants to persons whose lands abut watercourses
(riparians) two contradictory rights: (1) a right to receive the natural flow
of the stream in both quantity and quality, and (2) a right to make rea-
sonable uses of the water in the stream. 5 Reasonable uses include domes-
tic and livestock water supply, irrigation, manufacturing, and hydropower.26
No riparian can take all the water, but must share it with other riparians;
each is entitled only to his reasonable share. 27 A riparian's reasonable
share is that which is reasonable and fair in light of the water uses made
by other riparians, their effects on each other, the locations of uses and
diversions, and streamflow characteristics.2"
Water claimed under the riparian doctrine can be used only on riparian
land.29 Some jurisdictions declare nonriparian diversions actionable per
23. Tyler was described in England by C. GALE & T. WHATLEY, EASEMENTS 131-32, 331-38 (1 st
ed. 1839), and Acton v. Blundell, 12 M. & W. 324, 350, 152 Eng. Rep. 1223, 1233 (Ex. 1843)
(dictum). The riparian doctrine was adopted in England by Wood v. Waud, 3 Ex. 748, 154 Eng.
Rep. 1047 (1849), and Embrey v. Owen, 6 Ex. 353, 155 Eng. Rep. 579 (1851). It spread to the
British Empire by Miner v. Gilmour, 12 Moore 131, 14 Eng. Rep. 861 (Low. Can. 1858); and Lord
v. Commissioners for the City of Sydney, 12 Moore 473, 14 Eng. Rep, 991 (N.S.W. 1859).
24. See infra text accompanying notes 46-54.
25. Both aspects traditionally have been recited as part of the formulation of rights of riparians,
and stem from the landmark case announcing the riparian doctrine. Tyler v. Wilkinson, 24 FCas.
472 (C.C.D.R,I, 1827) (No. 14,312). Cases emphasizing the natural flow aspect include: Moore v.
California Oregon Power Co., 22 Cal.2d 725, 140 P.2d 798 (1943); McCord v. Big Brothers
Movement, Inc., 120 N.J. Eq. 446, 185 A. 1480 (1936). Cases emphasizing the reasonable use
aspect include: Harris v. Brooks, 225 Ark. 436, 283 S.W.2d 129 (1955); Evans v. Merriweather, 4
III. (3 Scam.) 492 (1842); Bollinger v. Henry, 375 S.W.2d 161 (Mo. 1964).
On the riparian doctrine generally, see Butler, Allocating Consumptive Water Rights in a Riparian
Jurisdiction: Defining the Relationship Between Public and Private Interests, 47 U. Prrr. L. REV.
95, 125-37 (1985); Hutchins, Background and Modern Developments in State Water-Rights Law, in
I WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 57, 66-71 (R. Clark ed. 1967 Supp., 1978); Davis, The Right to Use
Water in the Eastern States, in 7 WATERS AND WATER RIGHTS 27, 36-70 (R. Clark ed. 1976, Supp.
1978); Davis, Eastern Water Diversion Permit Statutes: Precedents for Missouri?, 47 Mo. L. Rev.
429, 432-39 (1982); Lauer, Reflections on Riparianism, 35 Mo. L. Rev. I, 3-15 (1970).
26. Tyler v. Wilkinson, 24 F.Cas. 472 (C.C.D.R.I. 1827) (No. 14,312); Moore v. California
Oregon Power Co., 22 Cal.2d 725, 140 P.2d 798 (1943); Prather v. Hoberg, 24 Cal.2d 549, 150
P.2d 405 (1944); Harris v. Brooks, 225 Ark. 436, 283 S.W.2d 129 (1955); Bollinger v. Henry, 375
S.W.2d 161 (Mo. 1964); Hazeltine v. Case, 46 Wis. 391, I N.W. 66 (1879).
27. Harris v. Brooks, 225 Ark. 436, 283 S.W.2d 129 (1955); Collens v. New Canaan Water Co..
155 Conn. 477, 234 A.2d 825 (1967); Bollinger v. Henry, 375 S.W.2d 161 (Mo. 1964).
28. Harris v. Brooks, 225 Ark. 436, 283 S.W.2d 129 (1955); Evans v. Merriweather, 4 Ill. (3
Scam.) 492 (1842); Townsend v. Bell, 167 N.Y. 462, 60 N.E. 757 (1901).
29. Two definitions of riparian land have evolved. One group of states limits use of water to that
abutting land which has never been severed from the frontage throughout its chain-of-title history.
Once nonabutting land has been severed, it can never regain riparian status by later being acquired
and merged with the frontage tract. That is the "source of title" rule, Anaheim Union Water Co. v.
Fuller, 150 Cal. 327, 88 P. 978 (1907); Watkins Land Co. v. Clements, 98 Tex. 578, 86 S.W. 733
(1905); Yearsley v. Cater, 149 Wash. 285, 270 P. 804 (1928).
The other group of states allows use of water on all tracts abutting or contiguous to an abutting
tract, regardless of the chain-of-title history or time of acquisition. That is the "unity of title" rule.
Clark v. Allaman, 71 Kan. 206, 80 P, 571 (1905); Jones v. Conn, 39 Ore. 30, 64 P. 855 (1901).
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se even in the absence of physical interference." Other jurisdictions make
nonriparian diversion actionable only if injury occurs. 3 Still others permit
transfer of riparian rights to nonriparian land.32 Such nonriparians' rights
are derivative of the grantor riparians' rights.3 3
Water Quality Protection
The riparian doctrine recognizes that use of water necessarily implies
a reduction in quality. One court stated it this way:
So the natural right ... to have the water descend to [a riparian] in
its pure state, fit to be used for the various purposes to which he
may have occasion to apply it, must yield to the equal right in those
who happen to be above him. Their use of the stream for mill pur-
poses, for irrigation, watering cattle, and the manifold purposes for
which they may lawfully use it, will tend to render the water more
or less impure. Cultivating and fertilizing the lands bordering on the
stream, and in which are its sources, their occupation by farm-houses
and other erections, will unavoidably cause impurities to be carried
into the stream. As the lands are subdivided and their occupation
and use become multifarious, these causes will be rendered more
operative, and their effects more perceptible. The water may thus be
rendered unfit for many uses for which it had before been suitable;
but so far as that condition results only from reasonable use of the
stream in accordance with the common right, the lower riparian
proprietor has no remedy.34
Interestingly, only one eastern state appears to have considered the riparian land question, and it
adopted the "unity of title" rule. Consolidated Water Supply Co. v. State Hosp. for Criminal Insane,
66 Pa. Super. 610 (1917).
One eastern state has held that the contiguous tract cannot be riparian if it is located an unreasonable
distance from the watercourse. Sparks Mfg. Co. v. Town of Newton, 57 N.J. Eq. 367, 41 A. 385(1898), rev'd on other grounds, 60 N.J. Eq. 399, 45 A. 596 (1900). See also McCartney v.
Londonderry & Lough Swilly Ry. 301 (1904 A.C.); Attwood v. Llay Main Collieries, I ch. 444
(1926). Those cases imply approval of the "unity of title" rule.
See generally, Butler, supra note 25, at 108-25; Farnham, The Permissible Extent of Riparian
Land, 7 LAND & WATER L. REV. 31 (1972); Davis, supra note 25, at 614-1 I; Lauer, supra note 25,
at 5-7; Davis, Australian andAmerican WaterAllocation Systems Compared, 9 B.C. INDUS. & COMM.
L. REV. 647, 680-87 (1968).
30. Anaheim Union Water Co. v. Fuller, 150 Cal. 327, 88 P. 978 (1907). See generally, Butler,
supra note 25, at 144-51.
31. Gehlen v. Knorr, 101 Iowa 700, 70 N. W. 757 (1897); Stratton v. Mt. Hermon Boys' School,
216 Mass. 83, 103 N.E. 87 (1913).
32. Pyle v. Gilbert, 245 Ga. 403, 265 S.E.2d 584 (1980); Gillis v. Chase, 67 N.H. 161, 31 A.
18 (1892); Lawrie v. Silsby, 76 Vt. 240, 56 A. 1106 (1904); Thurston v. City of Portsmouth, 205
Va. 909, 140 S.E.2d 678 (1965). See generally, Butler, supra note 25, at 139-44.
33. Smith v. Stanolind Oil & Gas Co., 197 Okla. 499, 172 P.2d 1002 (1946); State v. Apfelbacher,
167 Wis. 233, 167 N.W. 244 (1918).
34. Merrifield v. City of Worcester, 110 Mass. 216, 219 (1872). Accord, Tennessee Coal, Iron
& R.R. Co. v. Hamilton, 100 Ala. 252, 14 So. 167 (1893); Lockwood v. Lawrence, 77 Me. 297
(1885); Parker v. American Woolen Co., 195 Mass. 591, 81 N.E. 468 (1907); Snow v. Parsons, 28
Vt. 459 (1856); see generally, Davis, Theories of Water Pollution Litigation, 1971 Wis. L. REV.
738, 745-50 (hereinafter Water Pollution Litigation).
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This right has been interpreted as encompassing an affirmative right to
discharge wastes to a reasonable extent.35 An unreasonable waste dis-
charge is one which causes an appreciable or substantial injury to other
riparians, not merely slight inconveniences or occasional annoyances.'
Factors to be considered in determining the reasonableness of a waste
discharge include the nature of the respective uses, locations, and nature
of discharges of the respective parties, the size and flow characteristics
of the stream, the effect of the discharges on the water uses of the parties,
the availablity and expense of alternative water supplies, the availability
and expenses of abating the discharges, and the like.37 A few cases,
however, literally impose the natural flow obligation by forbidding any
diminution in quality.38
Similar to diversion rights, the riparian right to discharge wastes is, of
course, limited to riparians; nonriparians have no inherent right to dis-
charge wastes.39 Because they usually own abutting lands at the points
of discharge, municipalities are considered riparians even though the
wastes are collected from throughout the community.' No cases have
discussed whether a riparian's right to discharge wastes can be transferred
to a nonriparian. Cases permitting transfer of diversion rights, however,
would suggest that a transfer of discharge rights ought to be valid in those
jurisdictions.
The reasonable use formulation of the riparian doctrine requires a
balancing between the interests of water users. Balancing also is required
35. Parker v. American Woolen Co., 195 Mass. 591, 81 N.E. 468 (1907). See generally, Davis,
Water Pollution Litigation, supra note 34, at 745-49, 805.
36. TennesseeCoal, Iron & R.R. Co. v. Hamilton, 100Ala. 252, 14 So. 167 (1893);Tetherington
v. Donk Bros. Coal & Coke Co., 232 I1. 522, 83 N.E. 1048 (1908); Muncie Pulp Co. v. Koontz,
33 Ind. App. 532, 70 N.E. 999 (1904); Townsend v. Bell, 167 N.Y. 462, 60 N.E. 757 (1901); Snow
v. Parsons, 28 Vt. 459 (1856).
37. Red River Roller Mills v. Wright, 30 Minn. 249, 15 N.W. 167 (1883); Hayes v. Waldron,
44 N.H. 580 (1863); Townsend v. Bell, 167 N.Y. 462, 60 N.E. 757 (1901). See generally, Water
Pollution Litigation, supra note 34, at 747-48.
38. City of Richmond v. Test, 18 Ind. App. 482, 48 N.E. 610 (1887); H. B. Bowling Coal Co.
v. Ruffuer, 117 Tenn. 180, 100 S.W. 116 (1906).
39. Harvey Realty Co. v. Borough of Wallingford, I I I Conn. 352, 150 A. 60 (1930); Stanton
v. St. Joseph's College, 254 A.2d 597 (Me. 1969); Sterling Iron & Zinc Co. v. Sparks Mfg. Co.,
55 N.J. Eq. 824, 38 A. 426 (1897); McKinney v, Deneen, 231 N.C. 540, 58 S.E.2d 107 (1950).
40. Kraver v. Smith, 164 Ky. 674, 177 S.W. 286 (1915); City of Cape Girardeau v. Hunze, 314
Mo. 438, 284 S.W. 471 (1926); Simmons v. City of Paterson, 58 N.J. Eq. I, 42 A. 749 (N.J. Ch.
1899), rev'don other grounds, 60 N.J. Eq. 385, 45 A. 995 (1900); Clinard v. Town of Kemersville,
215 N.C. 745, 3 S.E.2d 267 (1939); Johnson v. Kraft-Phenix Cheese Corp., 19 Tenn. App. 648,
94 S.W.2d 54 (1935). These cases hold only that the municipality is a riparian at the point of
discharge and do not address the question whether discharge of wastes collected from nonriparian
land is a nonriparian activity. However, one municipal water supply diversion case reasoned in the
opposite direction, that since discharge of wastes is a riparian activity, diversion of water to non-
riparian land in the city also should be regarded as a riparian activity. City of Canton v. Shock, 66
Ohio St. 19, 63 N.E. 600 (1902). No other diversion case has adopted that reasoning.
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between water users and waste dischargers. That means that water users
cannot insist upon a prohibition of discharges,4 ' and that dischargers
cannot contaminate a watercourse so much so as to render it unusable by
other riparians.42 Because of the riparian land restriction, only riparian
water users can enforce their rights against dischargers; nonriparian users
cannot."3
Protection of Assimilative Capacity
There is no case law addressing the issue of whether a riparian waste
discharger can enjoin riparian diversions which interfere with the assim-
ilative capacity of a watercourse. However, there are a few riparian
recreational use cases which have established minimum flows or lake
levels that could not be interfered with by diversions.' By analogy,
minimum flows for waste assimilation also might be protected judi-
cially. There are two ways to analyse the question. First, riparians have
a right to discharge and to take advantage of that assimilative capacity.
Hence, an interfering diversion could be considered unreasonable. Sec-
ond, a waste discharge could be considered a form of consumption which
preempts the entire flow of the watercourse. Under the latter view, the
discharging riparian would be using an unreasonably large proportion of
the flow. Both of those views have found limited judicial favor with
respect to water users in prior appropriation states. '5
The ultimate test, I believe, ought to be based on the riparian com-
41. Stamford Extract Mfg. Co. v. Stamford Rolling Mills Co., 10l Conn. 310, 125 A. 623 (1924);
Helfrich v. Catonsville Water Co., 74 Md. 269, 22 A. 72 (1891); Red Roller Mills v. Wright, 30
Minn. 249, 14 N.W. 167 (1883); Borough of Westville v. Whitney Home Builders, Inc., 40 N.J.
Super. 62, 122 A.2d 233 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1956); McDonough v. Russell-Miller Milling
Co., 38 N.D. 465, 165 N.W. 504 (1917); Barakis v. American Cyanamid Co., 161 F.Supp. 25(N.D. Tex. 1958); Panther Coal Co. v. Looney, 185 Va. 758, 40 S.E.2d 298 (1946); McEvoy v.
Taylor, 56 Wash. 357, 105 P. 851 (1909).
42. McLaughlin v. City of Hope, 107 Ark. 442, 155 S.W. 910 (1913); Muncie Pulp Co. v.
Koontz, 33 Ind. App. 532, 70 N.E. 999 (1904); Ferguson v. Firmenich Mfg. Co., 77 Iowa 576,
42 N.W. 448 (1889); Merrifield v. City of Worcester, 110 Mass. 216 (1872), Parker v. American
Woolen Co., 195 Mass. 591, 81 N.E. 468 (1907); Monroe Carp Pond Co. v. River Raisin Paper
Co., 240 Mich. 279, 215 N.W. 325 (1927); Cook v. Town of Mebane, 191 N.C. 1, 131 S.E. 407
(1926); Duncan v. Union Buffalo Mills Co., 110 S.C. 302, 96 S.E. 522 (1917); American Cyanamid
Co. v. Sparto, 267 F.2d 425 (5th Cir. 1959-Tex.); Packwood v. Mendota Coal & Coke Co., 84
Wash. 47, 146 P. 163 (1915); Thropp v. Harpers Ferry Paper Co., 142 F. 690 (4th Cir. 1902-Vt.).
43. Kennebunk, Kennebunkport & Wells Water Dist. v. Maine Tumpike Authority, 145 Me. 35,
71 A.2d 520 (1950). In this case, a nonriparian grantee of riparian diversionary rights was held to
have no enforceable riparian water quality right.
44. Collens v. New Canaan Water Co., 155 Conn. 477, 234 A.2d 825 (1967); Harris v. Brooks,
225 Ark. 436, 283 S.W.2d 129 (1955). See generally, Davis, The Riparian Right of Streamflow
Protection in the Eastern States, 36 ARK. L. REV. 48 (1983).
45. Compare Conrad v. Arrowhead Hot Springs Hotel Co., 103 Cal. 399, 37 P. 386 (1894), with
Suffolk Gold Mining & Milling Co. v. San Miguel Consol. Mining & Milling Co., 9 Colo. App.
407, 48 P. 828 (1897).
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parative reasonableness test. The issue ought to be whether the waste
discharge unreasonably interferes with the right of other riparians to use
or divert their reasonable shares. To the extent that a waste discharge
does not unreasonably interfere with other uses of the water, waste assim-
ilative capacity required by riparian waste dischargers ought to be pro-
tected from unreasonable diversions.
Eastern Diversion Permit Statutes
Fourteen of the thirty-one eastern states have enacted diversion permit
statutes [eastern permit states].' With one exception, Mississippi,' the
eastern permit states have eschewed the prior appropriation doctrine.4
Allocation is based on ad hoc determinations of the public interest.49 In
practice, the eastern permit states have had enough water available to
satisfy all permit applicants, and have not had to face the difficult question
of deciding who will and who will not be granted a permit."
Eight of the 14 eastern permit states are empowered by statute to
establish minimum protected streamflows; they prohibit diversion of those
protected minimum flows.5 The usual policy purpose recited for estab-
46. See generally, Sherk, Eastern Water Law, I NAT. RES. & ENV'T 7 (1986); Ausness, Water
Rights Legislation in the East: A Program for Reform, 24 WM. & MARY L. REV. 547 (1983); Davis,
Eastern Water Diversion Permit Statutes: Precedents for Missouri?, 47 Mo. L. Rev. 429 (1982)
[hereinafter Eastern Water Diversion Permit Statutes]; Ausness, Water Use Permits in a Riparian
State: Problems and Proposals, 66 Ky. L.J. 191 (1977-78).
47. MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 51-3-1 to -53 (1973 & 1987 Cumin. Supp.).
48. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 15-22-201 to -504 (1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, §§6001-6060 (1983
Repl.); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 73.106-.191 (1987); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 17-502, 17-510.1 (1978, Supp.
1987); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 13-2-1-1 to -2-29-2 (Bums 1987 Repl.); IowA CODE §§ 455A.I-.40 (1971
& 1987 Cumm. Supp.); KY. REV. STAT. §§ 151.100-.990 (1978, Supp. 1987); MD. NAT. RES. CODE
ANN. §§8-101 to -407 (1983 Repl. & 1987 Cumin. Supp.); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 105.37-.81 (West
1987 & 1988 Cumm. Supp.); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§58:1A-2 to -17 (1982); N.Y. ENVT'L CONSERV.
LAW §§ 15-0503 to -2723 (McKinney 1984 & 1988 Cumm. Supp.); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 143-215.11
to .61 (1987); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 30.18 (West 1973 & 1987 Cumm. Supp.)
49. Eastern Water Diversion Permit Statutes, supra note 46, at 450-53.
50. Id. at 453.
51. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 21- 1306A(1) (1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 6029(4)-(2) (by implication)
(1983 Repl.)); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§373.042, -. 223(3) (1987); IOWA CODE ANN. §§455A, I, .18,
.22. .24 (1971 & 1987 Cumm Supp.); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 105.417 (1987); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 51 -
3-3(i) to (j), -7(3) to (4) (1987). N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:1A-3 (1982); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 31.34 (West
1973). See generally DAvis, supra note 25, at 459-60; Sherk, supra note 46, at 55.
Some of those statutes provide a formula for calculating the minimum protected flow. Arkansas
requires maintenance of flow sufficient to protect the rights of lower riparians and to protect dependent
fish and wildlife. ARK. CODE ANN. § 15-22-210(I). Delaware requires maintenance of the average
minimum flow for lowest seven consecutive days within the lowest flow year of record. DEL, CODE
ANN. tit. 7, § 6029(l)-(2). Mississippi requires maintenance of the average minimum daily flow
during each of the five lowest years during the preceding twenty years. Miss. CODE ANN. § 51-3-
3(i). Wisconsin requires maintenance of 25% of natural low flow. Wis. STAT. ANN. §31.34. By
regulation, Iowa requires maintenance of the flow which is equal to or exceeded at least 84% of the
time between Apr. and Sept. in years representative of normal conditions. Hines, A Decade of
Experience under the Iowa Water Permit System-Part!, 7 NAT. RES. J. 499, 541-42 (1967).
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lishing minimum streamflows is to protect fish and wildlife habitat and
recreational uses of watercourses. 2 Only the Georgia statute recites pro-
tection of waste assimilative capacity as a purpose. 3 Presumably, the
eastern permit states could establish minimum protected flows under exist-
ing statutory authority adequate to protect waste assimilative capacity
because fish and wildlife habitat and recreation potential would be affected
by reduced water quality.
The remaining 16 eastern common law states have no statutory regu-
lation of diversions whatsoever. Hence, those states have no statutory
authority for protecting the waste assimilative capacities of their receiving
waters, although their water pollution control statutes presume adequate
waste assimilative capacity exists and will be maintained.
Western States
Prior Appropriation
The seventeen western states and Alaska follow the prior appropriation
doctrine in allocating water between users. The doctrine was recognized
first in 1855 in the landmark case of Irwin v. Phillips.54 It spread rapidly
throughout many of the new western states, 5 although a few western
states did not replace the riparian doctrine with prior appropriation until
the first half of the twentieth century.'6
The prior appropriation doctrine provides that users are entitled to take
their full appropriations of water in historic chronological order of first
use until the water supply is exhausted. In times of shortage, the latest
appropriators will be cut off in inverse historic order until demand equals
supply. That chronological allocation is described by the maxim "first in
52. ARK. CODE ANN. § 15-22-201 (1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, §6001(a)(4), (c)(3) (1983
Repl.); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 373.016(2) (1987); MINN. ANN. STAT. § 105.38(l) (West 1987).
53. GA. CODE § 17-502 (1978, Supp. 1987).
54. 5 Cal. 140 (1855). Various origins of the prior appropriation doctrine have been suggested,
including mining customs, Spanish and Mexican influences, Mormon agricultural practices, and
American Indian customs. See generally, A. DUNBAR, FORGING NEW RIGHTS IN WESTERN WATERS
(1983); 1 HUTCHINS, WATER RIGHTS LAWS OF THE NINETEEN WESTERN STATES 159-65 (U.S. Dep't
Agric. Misc. Pub. No. 1206, 1971) [hereinafter NINETEEN WESTERN STATES]; Hutchins, Background
and Modern Developments in State Water-Rights Law, in I WATERS & WATER RIGHTS 57, 74-78 (R.
Clark ed. 1967 & Supp. 1978) [hereinafter Background].
55. Early prior appropriation cases include: Noland v. Coon, I Alaska 36 (1890); Clough v. Wing,
2 Ariz. 371, 17 P. 453 (1888); Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443 (1882); Thorp v. Woolman,
I Mont. 168 (1870); Lobdell v. Simpson, 2 Nev. 274 (1866); United States v. Rio Grande Dam &
Irrigation Co., 9 N.M. 292, 51 p. 674 (1898), rev'd on other grounds, 174 U.S. 690 (1899). See
generally, NINETEEN WESTERN STATES, supra note 54, at 159-75.
56. California Oregon Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 295 U.S. 142 (1935); State
ex rel. Emery v. Knapp, 167 Kan. 546, 207 P.2d 440 (1949); Knight v. Grimes, 8 S.D. 517, 127
tN.!W.2d 708 (1964). See generally, NINETEEN WESTERN STATES, supra note 54, at 192-99.
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time, first in right." 7 Appropriators are entitled to that definite quantity
of water which they first took and used. A diversion from the watercourse"H
and application of a specific quantity of water 9 to a "beneficial use"'
with due diligence6 ' are conditions precedent to the appropriative right,
which dates from the date of the claim to the water.62 Water can be used
on any land, riparian or nonriparian.63 In this century, the prior appro-
priation systems in all western states have been administered under sta-
tutory permit systems. 64
Water Quality Protection
Prior appropriation waste discharge cases hold that a senior appropriator
cannot expect to retain natural quality of flow, but must expect some
deterioration in quality by the activities of upstream junior appropriators.
However, he is entitled to be free from unreasonable interference with
57. Irwin v. Phillips, 5 Cal. 140 (1855); Trade Dollar Consol. Mining Co. v. Fraser, 148 F. 585
(9th Cir. 1906) (applying Idaho law); Gunnison-Fayette Canal Co. v. Gunnison Irrigation Co., 22
Utah 2d 45, 448 P.2d 707 (1968); Rocky Ford Irrigation Co. v. Kents Lake Reservoir Co., 104
Utah 202, 135 P.2d 108 (1943).
On the prior appropriation doctrine, see generally, Clark, The Colorado Doctrine: Surface-Water
Rights byAppropriation Only, in 5 WATERS & WATER RIGHTS 39, 66-149 (R. Clark ed. 1972 & Supp.
1978).
58. A diversion must involve either a man-made withdrawal of water from the stream or an
impoundment of its flow. Lamont v. Riverside Irrigation Dist., 179 Colo. 134, 498 P.2d 1150 (1972);
Walsh v. Wallace, 26 Nev. 299, 67 P. 914 (1902); State ex rel. Reynolds v. Miranda, 83 N.M. 445,
493 P.2d 409 (1972); Warner Valley Stock Co. v. Lynch, 215 Ore. 523, 336 P.2d 884 (1959);
Crawford v. Lehi Irrigation Co., 10 Utah 2d 165, 350 P.2d 147 (1960); Hardy v. Beaver County
Irrigation Co., 65 Utah 28, 234 P. 524 (1924).
59. Huffine v. Miller, 74 Mont. 50, 237 P. 1103 (1925); Crawford v. Lehi Irrigation Co., 10
Utah 2d 165, 350 P.2d 147 (1960); Sowards v. Meagher, 37 Utah 212, 108 P. 1112 (1910); Reno
v. Richards, 32 Idaho 1, 178 P. 81 (1918).
60. Crawford v. Lehi Irrigation Co., 10 Utah 2d 165, 350 P.2d 147 (1960). A beneficial use
traditionally has been defined as an economic use. Empire Water & Power Co. v. Cascade Town
Co., 205 F. 123 (8th Cir. 1913) (applying Colo. law). Cases have held that diversions which do
not enure to the exclusive benefit of the diverter cannot be beneficial uses. Lake Shore Duck Club
v. Lake View Duck Club, 50 Utah 76, 166 P. 309 (1917). Beneficial uses include irrigation: Vineyard
Land & Stock Co. v. Twin Falls Oakley Land & Water Co., 245 F. 30 (D. Nev. 1917); Santa Cruz
Reservoir Co. v. Rameriz, 16 Ariz. 64, 141 P. 120 (1914); State ex rel. Silve v. District Court, 105
Mont, 106, 69 P.2d 972 (1937); stock watering: Ward v. Kidd, 87 Idaho 216, 392 P.2d 183 (1964);
First State Bank v. McNew, 33 N.M. 414, 269 P. 56 (1928); mining: Fitzpatrick v. Montgomery,
20 Mont. 181, 50 P. 416 (1897); domestic uses: Silver Peak Mines v. Valcalda, 79 F. 886 (D. Nev.
1897); and industrial uses: Parker v. McIntyre, 47 Ariz. 484, 56 P.2d 1337 (1936).
61. City & County of Denver v. Northern Colo. Water Conserv. Dist., 130 Colo. 375, 276 P.2d
992 (1954); Crawford v. Lehi Irrigation Co., 10 Utah 2d 165, 350 P.2d 147 (1960).
62. City & County of Denver v. Northern Colo. Water Conserv. Dist., 130 Colo. 375, 276 P.2d
992 (1954); in re Humboldt River System, 77 Nev. 244, 362 P.2d 265 (1961); McGarry v. Thompson,
114 Utah 442, 201 P.2d 288 (1948).
63. Coffin v. Left Hand Ditch Co., 6 Colo. 443 (1882).
64. See generally, Clark, supra note 57, at 99-107; NINETEEN WESTERN STATES, supra note 54,
at 298-301; Background, supra note 54, at 94-124. See infra notes 68 & 70 and accompanying text
for a discussion of prior appropriation permit systems.
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the fair enjoyment of his prior appropriative right by material deterioration
of water quality.6'
Jurisdictions disagree whether a downstream junior appropriator must
accept degraded water quality resulting from a senior appropriator's use.
A California court held that the junior user takes the water as he finds it,
both in quantity and quality; pollution resulting from a senior user's lawful
use is considered part of his use.' By contrast, a Colorado court held
that by rendering the watercourse unfit for diversionary uses by a junior
user, a polluting senior user had unlawfully appropriated the entire flow
of the watercourse. The senior user had not only appropriated the water
he diverted, but also the entire flow left in the stream by rendering it
unfit for their use.67 Courts in most western states have not determined
the water quality rights of junior appropriators.
The right to discharge wastes in prior appropriation cases is acknowl-
edged in terms of water quality degradation stemming from water diver-
sion and use. No court has considered whether there is an independent
nondiversionary right to discharge wastes into a watercourse within the
prior appropriation system. Traditional prior appropriation theory ought
not to acknowledge such a right, since the conditions precedent to the
appropriative right are not satisfied.
Statutory Prior Appropriation Permit Statutes
Beginning in the 1890s, the western states began enacting diversion
permit statutes. They continued to recognize the case law principles of
prior appropriation," but required an application for a permit as a pre-
requisite for a valid appropriation. 9 Today all 17 western states, Alaska,
and Mississippi (an eastern state) have prior appropriation permit statutes
in force.70
65. Dripps v. Allison's Mines Co., 45 Cal.App. 95, 187 P. 448 (1919); Farmers' Highline Canal
& Reservoir Co. v. City of Golden, 129 Colo. 575, 272 P.2d 629 (1954); Ravndal v. Northfork
Placers, 60 Idaho 305, 91 P.2d 368 (1939); Drake v. Smith, 54 Wash.2d 57, 337 P.2d 1059 (1959).
See generally, NINETEEN WESTERN STATES, supra note 54, at 448-54.
66. Conrad v. Arrowhead Hot Springs Hotel Co., 103 Cal. 399, 37 P. 386 (1894).
67. Suffolk Gold Mining & Milling Co. v. San Miguel Consol. Mining & Milling Co., 9 Colo.
App. 407, 48 P. 828 (1897).
68. Wyoming Hereford Ranch v. Hammond Packing Co., 33 Wyo. 14, 236 P. 764 (1925).
69. Parker v. McIntyre, 47 Ariz. 484, 56 P.2d 1337 (1936); Meridian, Ltd. v. City & County of
San Francisco, 13 Cal. 2d 424, 91 P.2d 105 (1939); Enterprise Irrigation Dist. v. Tri-State Land
Co., 92 Neb. 121, 138 N.W. 171 (1912); Harkey v. Smith, 31 N.M. 521,247 R 550 (1926); Staub
v. Jensen, 180 Ore. 682, 178 P.2d 931 (1947); Hanson v. Salt Lake City, 115 Utah 404, 205 P.2d
255 (1949); Wyoming Hereford Ranch v. Hammond Packing Co., 33 Wyo. 14, 236 P. 764 (1925).
70. ALASKA STAT. §§ 46.15.010 to 180 (1984); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 45-141 to -276(1987);
CAL. WATER CODE §§ 1200 to 2900 (West 1971 & Supp. 1988); COLO. REV. STAT. §§37-92-101
to -602 (1973 & 1985 Cumin. Supp.); IDAHO CODE §§42-201 to -352 (1987); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§§ 82a-701 to -731 (1984); MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 51-3-1 to -53 (1987); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 85-2-
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Protection of Assimilative Capacity
The diversion and beneficial use prerequisites make it difficult, if not
impossible, to preserve minimum flows for recreational purposes by filing
for an appropriation. Water can be appropriated only by making a diver-
sion and applying it to a beneficial use. Generally, an appropriation must
involve either a diversion of water from the stream or impoundment of
its flow by a dam.7 Since instream uses involve neither, appropriations
for instream uses, such as fish habitat, cannot be made under traditional
law. 2 Traditional prior appropriation law does not permit recognition of
an appropriative right for instream uses regardless of economic value.
For example, no appropriation occurs when natural overflow is relied on
for irrigation,73 or when a marsh fed by natural river flow is used for
commercial duck hunting74 or for fish and wildlife habitat. 75 Hence, there
is no basis under traditional theory for appropriating flow for protection
of waste assimilative capacity.
Some western states have amended their prior appropriation statutes
in ways which confer a greater ability on state agencies to protect waste
assimilative capacity. These include the traditional authority to deny a
permit if it would be contrary to the "public interest," recent declarations
that waste assimilation is a public purpose and that fish habitat protection
and recreation are beneficial uses, and authority for the state agency to
make appropriations for fish habitat and recreation.
"Public Interest" Permit Denials. Minimum flows might be protected
by denying permit applications for new appropriations or limiting the
101 to -431 (1987); NEB. REv. STAT. §§46-233 to -2,119 (1984 & 1987 Supp.); NEV. REV. STAT.
§§533.325 to .540 (1986); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§72-1-1 to -2 (1985), 72-5-1 to -39 (1985 & 1987
Cumm. Supp.); N.D. CENT. CODE §§61-04-01 to -31 (1985); OKLA. STAT. tit. 82, §§ 105.1 to .32
(1988); ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 537.110 to .450 (1985); S.D. CODIFiED LAWS §§46-1-1 to -15, 46-2A-
I to -18, 46-5-1 to -49 (1987); TEX. WATER CODE ANN. §§ 11.001 to .186 (Vernon) (1988 Supp.);
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 73- 1-1 to -5, -11, 73-3-I to -29 (1987 Cumn. Supp.); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§§90.03.010 to .030, 90.03-.250 to -.480 (1967 & 1987 Cumm. Supp.); Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§41-
3-101 to -105, -401 to -402 (1987 Cumn. Supp.).
71. See supra note 58.
72. Schodde v. Twin Falls Land & Water Co., 224 U.S. 107 (1912); Fullerton v. State Water
Resources Control Bd., 90 Cal. App. 3d 590, 153 Cal. Rptr. 518 (1979); California Trout, Inc. v.
State Water Resources Control Bd., 90 Cal. App. 3d 816, 153 Cal. Rptr. 672 (1979); Colorado
River Conservation Dist. v. Rocky Mountain Power Co., 158 Colo. 331, 406 P.2d 798 (1965); State
ex rel. Reynolds v. Miranda, 83 N.M. 443, 493 P.2d 409 (1972). See generally, Ausness, Water
Rights, The Public Trust Doctrine, and the Protection of Instream Uses, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 407,
420-21; Tarlock, Recent Developments in the Recognition of Instream Uses in Western Water Law,
1975 UTAH L. REV. 871, 877-79, 883-84.
73. Warner Valley Stock Co. v. Lynch, 215 Ore. 523, 336 P.2d 884 (1959).
74. Lake Shore Duck Club v. Lake View Duck Club, 50 Utah 76, 166 P. 309 (1917).
75. California Trout, Inc. v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 90 Cal.App.3d 816, 153 Cal.
Rptr. 672 (1979); Fullerton v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 90 Cal.App.3d 590, 153 Cal.
Rptr. 518 (1979).
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sizes of diversions. Some cases suggest that state agencies have authority
to deny applications for appropriation permits where the use would not
be a beneficial one or would be detrimental to the public welfare because
it would do more harm than good. 6 However, courts probably would be
very suspicious of a denial of a permit in order to protect an existing
instream, and therefore traditionally nonappropriative, use. In one case,
however, a court upheld the denial of a permit for a diversion which
would lower the level of a recreational lake.77 Furthermore, some states
have limited sizes of diversions in order to preserve minimum flows.
Such practices have been upheld for fish habitat protection purposes.'
Waste Assimilation a "Public Purpose". A direct method for pro-
tecting minimum flow for waste assimilation is to declare protection of
water quality a "public purpose." Then, under a statute allowing the state
agency to deny or limit a prior appropriation permit in order to protect
the public interest, the agency could protect waste assimilation capacity.
In Shokal v. Dunn,'9 such a statute' was held valid. The agency imposed
limits on the size of diversion to and on the quality of effluent from a
proposed hydroelectric and fish propagation project in order to assure that
receiving stream water quality standards would be complied with. The
court held that "public interest" statutes in general were valid, that pre-
serving water quality was in the public interest, and that the size of the
appropriation and the quality of the return effluent could be conditioned
to preserve the quality of water remaining in the stream.8
Only one other state appears to have enacted legislation declaring water
quality protection to be a factor in determining whether a proposed diver-
sion is consistent with the public interest. Mississippi, the only eastern
76. Tanner v. Bacon, 103 Utah 494, 136 P.2d 957 (1943); East Bay Muni. Util. Dist. v. Dep't
of Public Works, I Cal.2d 476, 35 P.2d 1027 (1934) (making a hydropower appropriation subject
to future appropriations for irrigation or municipal purposes).
77. In re Martha Lake Water Co., 152 Wash. 53, 277 P. 382 (1929).
78. Bank of America v. State Water Resources Control Bd., 42 Cal.App.3d 198, 116 Cal. Rptr.
770 (1974). See generally, Tarlock, Appropriation for Instream Flow Maintenance: A Progress
Report on "New" Public Western Water Rights, 1978 UTAH L. REV. 211, 233-40.
79. 707 P.2d 441 (Idaho 1985).
80. IDAHO CODE §42-1501 (1987 Cumm. Supp.) provided that it was "in the public interest"
that:
the streams of this state and their environments be protected against loss of water ...
supply to preserve the minimum stream flows required for the protection of fish and
wildlife habitat, aquatic life, recreation, aesthetic beauty, transportation and navigation
values, and water quality.
81. Shokal v. Dunn, 707 P.2d 441, 451-52 (Idaho 1985). The court concluded:
It makes no sense whatsoever for Water Resources to blindly grant permit requests
without regard to water quality regulations. Hence, Water Resources should condition
the issuance of a permit on a showing by the applicant that a proposed facility will
meet the mandatory water quality standards.
Id. at 452.
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state to enact a prior appropriation system, specifically authorizes denial
of permit applications for protection of water quality. That statute provides
that no diversion should be allowed which impairs the effect of water
quality standards based on minimum streamflows.82
Fish and Recreation a "Beneficial Use". Another method for curing
difficulties imposed by the traditional requirements for an actual diversion
and a beneficial use is to declare instream fish and wildlife habitat, and
recreational uses to be beneficial uses. This has been done in a few states
by case decision 3 and in several more states by statute." Those cases
and statutes reverse the traditional rule that such uses could not give rise
to a valid appropriation. The rule change allows both private landowners
and state agencies to make appropriations to preserve streamflows for
fish and wildlife habitat and recreational purposes. Presumably, stream-
flows for waste assimilation could be preserved under the guise of such
an appropriation.
Appropriations for Fish and Recreation. Several states have taken
a more limited approach. They have enacted statutes empowering state
agencies to appropriate unappropriated water for instream uses, such as
fish and wildlife habitat preservation and recreation."5 Other states author-
ize administrative withdrawal of unappropriated water." Still other states
82. MIss. CODE ANN. § 51-3-7(5) (1987 Cumm. Supp.).
83. Brasher v. Gibson, 2 Ariz.App. 91, 406 P.2d 441 (1965); State ex rel. State Game Comm'n
v. Red River Valley Co., 51 N.M. 207, 182 P.2d 421 (1945). See generally. Ausness, supra note
72, at 420.
84. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 45-141(A) (1987); CAL. WATER CODE § 1243 (West 1988); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 37-92-103(4) (1985 Supp.); MONT. CODE ANN. §85-2-102(2)(a) (1987); NEV. REV,
STAT. § 533.030(2) (1986); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 61-04-01.1, -02, -06.1 (1985); ORE. REV. STAT.
§ 537.170(5)(a) (1985); TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 11.023(7) (Vernon 1988 Supp.); WASH. REV.
CODE §90.54.020(I) (1987 Cumin. Supp.); WYo. STAT. §41-3-1001 (1987 Cumin. Supp.). See
generally, Ausness, supra note 72, at 420.
85. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. §§37-92-102(3), -103 (1985 Supp.); IDAHO CODE §§674301
to -4312 (1980 & 1987 Cumm. Supp.) (certain specified waters); NEB. REV. STAT. §§46-2,107 to
-2,119 (1984); Wyo. STAT. §§41-3-1006 to -1009 (1987 Cumin. Supp.). Such appropriations are
valid under statutory authority. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. Colorado Water Con-
servation Bd., 197 Colo. 469, 594 P.2d 570 (1979); State Dep't of Parks v. Idaho Dep't of Water
Admin., 96 Idaho 440, 530 P.2d 924 (1974). These cases do not require a physical diversion for
such statutory appropriations. See generally, Ausness, supra note 72, at 429-30; Tarlock, supra note
78, at 241-44.
But does CAL. WATER CODE § 1243 (West 1988), which declares water use for recreation and fish
and wildlife habitat to be a beneficial use, require a physical diversion? Water impounded for
recreational uses has been declared to be a beneficial use. State ex rel. Fish & Game Comm'n v.
Red River Valley Co., 51 N.M. 207, 182 P.2d 421 (1945).
One statute forbids new appropriations for maintaining minimum flows, but allows transfer of
existing state-owned appropriations to such purposes. UTAH CODE ANN. § 7-3-3(11) (1987 Cumin.
Supp.).
Reallocation of unappropriated water is an exercise of the police power. Tarlock, supra note 78,
at 221.
86. ALASKA STAT. §46.15.145 (1987) (including for water quality purposes); KAN. STAT. ANN.
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authorize denial of permit applications or imposition of flow maintenance
conditions where diversion would interfere with fish and wildlife habitat
or with recreational opportunities." These statutes do not permit private
landowners to make such appropriations.
None of these western statutes specifically identify preservation of
waste assimilitive capacity as an enumerated purpose. Hence, minimum
flows for waste assimilative capacity would have to be appropriated as
an incident to habitat preservation or recreational use protection.
Practical Limitation on Such Appropriations. Allowing an appro-
priation for instream fish and wildlife habitat or recreational purposes
would be of no use on fully appropriated streams. Many western streams
are fully appropriated."8 Where unappropriated flows do exist, such appro-
priated minimum flows would be junior to most diversions and physically
would disappear during water shortages. Thus, under instream flow appro-
priation authority, the western states would have only a limited ability to
protect the assimilative capacities of watercourses. If previously appro-
priated waters are needed to sustain the minimum protected flows, they
would have to be acquired by purchase or condemnation.8 9
OTHER COMMON LAW THEORIES
Besides the law of water allocation, other common law theories are
available to protect the waste assimilative capacity of streams. Litigation
§§ 82a-703a to -703b (1984) (to establish minimum streamflow); MIss. CODE ANN. § 51-3-7(2-3)
(1987); MoNT. CODE ANN. § 85-2-316(1) (1987); N.D. CETrr. CODE § 61-04-31 (1985) (coupled with
definition of "beneficial use"); WAsH. REV. CODEANN. §§ 90.22.010, 90.54.020(3)(a) (1987 Cumm.
Supp.).
California and Oklahoma declare certain rivers to be "free-flowing" and not subject to state
authorization of federal, state and local governmental development projects. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE
§§ 5093.50-.69 (West 1984 & 1988 Cumm. Supp.); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 82, §§ 1452(a), 1453
(1988); ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 538.110-.300 (1985).
87. ALASKA STAT. § 46.15.080 (1987). CAL WATER CODE § 1243.5 (West 1988); MoNT. REV.
CODE § 85-2-31 t(2)(c)(i) (1987); UTAH CODE ANN. §73-3-8(1) (1987 Cumin. Supp.); WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. §§90.22.010, 90.54.020(3)(a) (1987 Cumin. Supp.). See generally, Ausness, supra
note 72, at 431-32.
88. Research done as part of the Second National Water Assessment indicates that most western
streams are heavily depleted by diversions during dry summer months, and have little or no flows
available for instream uses. Bayha, Instream Flows-The Big Picture, in I AM. FISHERIES SOC'Y
INSTREAM FLOW NEEDS 95, 112-18 (1976) (contains maps showing actual streamflow depletions
exceeding 70% in dry years throughout most of the West).
Appropriations typically are greater than actual diversions. Hence, most western streams are fully
appropriated and have no unappropriated water available for instream use appropriations. Harison,
Legal Strategies for Implementing Instream Flows under Existing Federal and State Laws-Restoring
Minimum Flows to Already Overappropriated Streams, in I INSTREAM FLOW NEEDS, at 290 (1976).
89. Johnson, Public Trust Protection for Stream Flows and Lake Levels, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. REV.
233, 263 (1980); Tarlock, supra note 78, at 234; Trelease, The Legal Bases for Instream Flows, in
2 AM.FSHERIS SOC'Y INSTREAM FLOW NEEDS, I, 10 (1976); 1 HUTCHINS, WATER RIGHTS LAws IN
THE NINETEEN WESTERN STATES 407-09 (U.S. Dep't Agric. Misc. Pub. No. 1206, 1971).
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to protect the assimilative capacity of streams could be based on the
theories of private nuisance, public nuisance, or violation of the public
trust.
Effect of Statutes on the Common Law
Nonderogation by Statutes
Water pollution control statutes do not affect the applicability of the
common law. The Clean Water Act and most state statutes expressly
preserve common law rights.' Common law rights are independent of
statutory regulation because courts have held that the water pollution
control statutes do not empower regulatory agencies to adjudicate them.9
Some courts, however, defer common law actions until completion of
administrative proceedings under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
The states are in conflict whether that doctrine applies to water pollution
lawsuits.92
Citizen Suits
The Clean Water Act93 and several state acts9 4 expressly provide for
90. Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(e) (982); ALA. CODE §§22-22-09(r) (1987 Cumin.
Supp.), ALASKA STAT. §46.03.870(c) (1987); CAL. WATER CODE § 13350(j) (West 1988); COLD.
REV. STAT. §25-8-612(3) (1987); FLA. STAT. ANN. §403.191(a) (1982); GA. CODE ANN. § 12-5-46
(1982); HAW. REV. STAT. § 342-16 (1985); ILL. STAT. ANN. tit. I I I /z, § 1045(a) (1977); LA. REV.
STAT. tit. 30, § 1074(3) (1987 Supp. Pamp.); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 21, §42 (1987 Cumin.);
ch. 214, §7A (1987 Cumm.); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 115.08 (1986), 116B.12 (1987); Mo. REV.
STAT. §204.131 (1983); NEV. REV. STAT. §445.321 (1986); N.M. STAT. §74-6-13 (1987 Supp.);
N.Y. CONSERV. LAW § 17-1101 (McKinney 1984); OHIO REV. CODE §6111.08 (1986 Supp.); OKLA.
STAT. tit. 82, §§926.10(D), 932.1(a) (1988 Cumin. Supp.); PA. STAT. ANN. §691.701 (McKinney
1984); S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-1-240 (1987); S.D. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 34A-2-79 (1986); TEx. WATER
CODE tit. 2, §26.133 (1988 Supp.); UTAH CODE ANN. §26-11-19 (1984); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 10,
§ 1276 (1984); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 90.48.910 (1987 Cumm. Supp.); W.VA. CODE §20-5A-
22; Wyo. STAT. ANN. §35-11-901(f) (1987 Cumin. Supp); State ex rel. Dresser Indus., Inc. v.
Ruddy, 592 S.W.2d 789 (Mo. 1980); Urie v. Franconia Paper Corp., 107 N.H. 131, 218 A.2d 360
(1966); Kennedy V. Moog, Inc., 48 Misc.2d 107, 264 N.Y.S.2d 606 (1965), aflTd in part 26 A.D.2d
768, 271 N.Y.S.2d 928 (1966), aff-d 21 N.Y.2d 966, 237 N.E.2d 356, 290 N.Y.S.2d 193 (1968);
Biddix v. Henredon Furniture Indus., Inc., 76 N.C. App. 30, 331 S.E.2d 717 (1985); Board of
Comn'rs v. Mentor Lagoons, Inc., 6 Ohio Misc. 126, 216 N.E.2d 643 (1965).
91. Curdt v. Missouri Clean Water Comm'n, 586 S.W.2d 58 (Mo. App. 1979).
92. Compare White Lake Imp. Ass'n v. City of Whitehall, 22 Mich. App. 262, 177 N.W.2d 473
(1970); Ellison v. Rayonier, Inc., 156 F.Supp. 214 (W.D. Wash. 1957), with Stanton v. Trustees of
St. Joseph's College, 233 A.2d 718 (Me. 1967).
93. 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (1982). See generally, 2 S. NOVICK, D. STEVER & M. MELLON, LAW OF
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 12-165 to -175 (1987).
94. ARtz. REV. STAT. ANN. §49-264 (1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §22a-16 (1958); D.C.
CODE §6-939 (1987 Cumin. Supp.); FLA. STAT. ANN. §403:412 (1982); ILL. STAT. ANN. tit. 11
1/2, § 1045(b) (1977); Ky. REV. STAT. § 224.091 (1982) (mandamus against state agency only); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 1074 (1987 Supp. Pamp.); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 214, § 7A (1987
Cumin. Supp.); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 691.1202 (1987), MICH. STAT. ANN. § 14.528(202) (1980,
Supp. 1987); MINN. STAT. ANN. § I 16B.03 (1987); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 691.601(c), (e) (Supp.
1987); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 35-11-902 (1987 Cumin. Supp.).
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citizen lawsuits to enjoin future violations of the respective acts, subject
to conditions of 60 days notice and absence of preemptive agency liti-
gation. The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) or the state agency
may intervene with its own enforcement action and thereby bar the citizen
suit.95 Most state water pollution control statutes, however, do not provide
for citizen suits. Nonetheless, the federal provision extends to all vio-
lations of federal standards in all states, even in those states with unilateral
state administration under federally-approved state statutes.' Thus, water
diverters and users, as citizens, have the same right to enjoin unauthorized
waste discharges as do federal and state agencies, subject only to the 60
day notice requirement and possibility of preemptive agency enforcement
litigation.
The citizen suit right, however, is not necessarily equivalent to the
right to be free from water pollution recognized by the common law. The
citizen suit provisions do not create a private right of action for monetary
damages;97 the only remedy is injunctive relief.98 Although a discharge
in compliance with the Clean Water Act will foreclose rights under the
citizen suit provision, it nonetheless may be actionable as a nuisance
because common law remedies are expressly preserved by the Act."
Nuisance
The nuisance doctrine is one theory under which a water user can seek
95. EPA must intervene with an enforcement lawsuit, not with a mere administrative enforcement
proceeding. Friends of the Earth v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 768 F.2d 57 (2d Cir. 1985); Student
Public Interest Research Group (SPIRG) v. Fritzsche, Dodge & Olcutt, Inc., 759 F.2d 1131 (3d Cir.
1985). Initiating an investigation also is not sufficient. Proffitt v. Commissioners, Township of Bristol,
754 F.2d 504 (3d Cir. 1985) (EPA compliance order); SPIRG v. Tenneco Polymers, 602 F.Supp.
1394 (D.N.J. 1985) (EPA investigatory proceedings).
96. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1) (1982); Brewer v. City of Bristol, 577 F.Supp. 519 (E.D. Tenn. 1983)
(refusing to apply abstention doctrine).
97. Middlesex County Sewerage Authority v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981).
Neither the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251-1376, nor the Refuse Act of 1899, § 13, 33 U.S.C.
§ 407, nor the state water pollution control acts expressly create private rights to recover damages.
Nor is such a right created impliedly. Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 701 F.2d 1011
(2d Cir. 1983). Furthermore, no right to bring a private attomey-general action is created by the
Refuse Act of 1899 even though it provides for a bounty. City of Evansville v. Kentucky Liquid
Recycling, Inc., 604 F.2d 1008 (7th Cir. 1979); Connecticut Action Now, Inc. v. Roberts Plating
Co., 457 F.2d 81 (2d Cir. 1972); Bass Angler Sportsman Soc'y v. United States, 447 F.2d 1304
(5th Cir. 1971).
Violation of a state water pollution control act does not give rise to a private right to recover
damages. Several state acts provide that they do not enlarge common law rights. CoLo. REV. STAT.
§ 25-8-611(1) (1987); N.Y. CONSERV. LAw § 17-1103 (McKinney 1984 & 1988 Cumin. Supp.); P.R.
LAws ANN. tit. 24, §600 (1979); W.VA. CODE §20-5A-22(a); Wyo. STAT. ANN. §35-11-901(f)
(1987 Cumm. Supp.). Contra, S.C. CODE ANN. §48-1-250 (1987), which provides that violations
of the act inure to the benefit of damaged persons, but that no presumptions arise from agency
determinations of law or findings of fact.
98. Love v. New York State Dep't of Envt'l Conservation, 529 F.Supp. 832 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
99. State ex rel. Dresser Indus., Inc. v. Ruddy, 592 S.W.2d 789 (Mo. 1980) (public nuisance
action exists in spite of compliance with state act).
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relief from waste discharges which interfere with his use of water. The
law of nuisance is subdivided into two catagories, private nuisance and
public nuisance. Both give rise to rights enforceable by private individ-
uals. Public nuisance also gives rise to rights enforceable by public offi-
cials.
Private Nuisance
A private nuisance is a nontrespassory interference with the use and
enjoyment of another's land." As it relates to water pollution, a private
nuisance was once described as:
[S]uch impurities as substantially impair [the water's] value for the
ordinary purposes of life, and render it measurably unfit for domestic
purposes; or such as causes unwholesome or offensive odors to arise
from the water, and thus impairs the comfortable or beneficial enjoy-
ment of property in the vicinity, or such as, while producing no actual
sensible effect upon the water, are yet of a character calculated to
disgust the senses .... 10
Most private nuisance water pollution lawsuits have involved three types
of situations: (1) interference with a place of habitation or work, (2)
contamination of water supplies, and (3) destruction of soil fertility.102
Liability exists if the interference is unreasonable. 3
The existence of a private nuisance is not the equivalent of a violation
of riparian rights, although several courts have intermingled the two
doctrines.t" Instead, the private nuisance doctrine should be considered
as a limitation on activities which might otherwise be lawful under the
100. Bowman v. Humphrey, 124 Iowa 744, 100 N.W. 854 (1904); Baltimore v. Warren Mfg.
Co., 59 Md. 96 (1882); Trevett v. Prison Ass'n, 98 Va. 332, 36 S.E. 373 (1900).
101. Trevett v. Prison Ass'n, 98 Va. 332, 336, 36 S.E. 373, 374 (1900), quoting I WOOD,
NUISANCES §427 (3d ed. 1893).
102. Livezey v. Town of Bel Air, 174 Md. 568, 199 A. 838 (1938); Davis, Theories of Water
Pollution Litigation, 1971 Wis. L. REv. 738, 749-50, 806.
103. Davis, supra note 102, at 741. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 826(a) (1957);
RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 107-12 (1977 & 1984 Supp.); PROSSER, TORTS 405 (2d ed. 1955).
Many courts confuse the riparian right to make reasonable uses of watercourses and to be free
from unreasonable diminution of water quality with the right to be free from unreasonable interfer-
ences under private nuisance law. See Biddix v. Henredon Furniture Indus., Inc., 76 N.C. App. 30,
331 S.E.2d 717, 721 (1985); Alabama Consol. Coal & Iron Co. v, Turner, 145 Ala. 639, 649-50,
39 So. 603, 605 (1905); Davis, supra note 102, at 744 n.25. In most situations, the same quantum
of unreasonableness probably would trigger liability under both the riparian rights and private nuisance
doctrines.
104. See. e.g., Alabama Consol. Coal & Iron Co. v. Turner, 145 Ala., 649-50. 39 So. 605;
Peterson v. City of Santa Rosa, 119 Cal. 387, 392, 51 P. 557, 559 (1897); City of Kewanee v.
Otley, 204 III. 402, 409, 68 N.E. 388, 390-91 (1903); Holsman v. Boiling Spring Bleaching Co.,
14 N.J. Eq. 335, 342-43 (Ch. 1862); Middlestadt v. Waupaca Starch & Potato Co., 93 Wis. 1, 4,
66 N.W. 713, 714 (1896); Davis, supra note 102, at 743-44.
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riparian rights or prior appropriation doctrines.0 5 Furthermore, the private
nuisance doctrine protects all landowners, not just riparians.
Defenses are available in private nuisance lawsuits which can limit the
doctrine's usefulness. One defense is particularly troublesome. The courts,
particularly in suits seeking injunctive relief, tend to balance the equities.
This "comparative convenience" doctrine allows the court to deny relief
when the economic and social benefits of denying relief outweigh the
economic and social benefits of granting relief.0 7 Although many courts
give lip service to rejecting the doctrine, water pollution cases in only a
few states have granted relief to small plaintiffs as a result of activities
by large defendants,0 and one of those has been overruled."° Many
courts in fact, if not in theory, do balance the equities.
There have been no water pollution nuisance cases involving diversion
of waste assimilation streamflows."' Nuisance cases have focused on
activities causing affirmative interferences, not on the withholding of
mitigating flows. Whether the courts in the future will acknowledge and
give appropriate weight to the public interest in protecting minimum
streamflows for waste assimilation is problematical.
Public Nuisance
A public nuisance in the water pollution context is an interference with
public health, safety and comfort."' Most such public nuisance cases
105. Lawton v. Herrick, 83 Conn. 417, 76 A. 986 (1910); Squaw Island Freight Terminal Co.
v. City of Buffalo, 273 N.Y. 119, 7 N.E.2d 10 (1937).
106. Masonite Corp. v. Burnham, 164 Miss. 840, 146 So. 292 (1933).
107. Montgomery Limestone Co. v. Bearden, 256 Ala. 269, 54 So.2d 571 (1951); Wright v.
Best, 19 Cal.2d 368, 121 P.2d 702 (1942); City of Lakeland v. State ex rel, Harris, 143 Fla. 761,
197 So. 470 (1940); Smith v. City of Sedalia, 244 Mo. 107, 149 S.W. 597 (1912); Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Sanderson, 113 Pa. 126, 6 A. 453 (1886) (industrial defendants). Cf. Boomer v. Atlantic
Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257 N.E.2d 870, 309 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970).
But some states reject the doctrine and hold that the relative economic and social consequences
are irrelevant. Platt Bros. & Co. v. City of Waterbury, 72 Conn. 531, 45 A. 154 (1900); Barrington
Hills Country Club v. Village of Barrington, 357 Ill. Ii, 191 N.E. 239 (1934); Indianapolis Water
Co. v. American Strawboard Co., 53 F 970 (C.C.D. Ind. 1893); Bowman v. Humphrey, 132 Iowa
234, 109 N.W. 714 (1906); Morse v. City of Worcester, 139 Mass. 389, 2 N.E. 694 (1885). See
generally, Davis, supra note 102, at 762-67,
108. Hunter v. Taylor Coal Co., 16 Ky. L.Rptr. 190 (1894); Satren v. Hader Co-op Cheese
Factory, 202 Minn. 553, 279 N.W. 361 (1938); Whalen v. Union Bag & Paper Co., 208 N.Y. 1,
101 N.E. 805 (1913); McCune v. Pittsburgh & B. Coal Co., 238 Pa. 83, 85 A. 1102 (1913).
109. Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219,257 N.E.2d 870,309 N.Y.S.2d 312 (1970).
110. In my 1971 study of water pollution nuisance cases, I found no such cases. See Davis, supra
note 102. 1 have not examined post-1971 cases.
11. Indianapolis Water Co. v. American Strawboard Co., 53 F 970, 57 F 1000 (C.C.D. Ind.
1893); City of Henderson v. Robinson, 152 Ky. 245, 153 S.W. 224 (1913); Sprague v. Dorr, 185
Mass. 10, 69 N.E. 344 (1904); Attomey-General ex rel. Township of Wyoming v. City of Grand
Rapids, 175 Mich. 503, 141 N.W. 890 (1913); State Bd. of Health v. lhnken, 72 N.J. Eq. 865, 67
A. 28 (1907); Town of Shelby v. Cleveland Mill & Power Co., 155 N.C. 196, 71 S.E. 218 (1911);
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have involved odors in residential areas, contamination of public water
supplies, and water quality degradation."'
Generally, public nuisance.lawsuits are brought by a public official." 3
A private individual can bring a public nuisance action, however, if he
has suffered special damage. In most states, such a plaintiff must have
suffered injury which is different in kind and degree from that suffered
by the public at large." 4 An example of special damages might be con-
tamination of a domestic water supply while the public suffers only from
noxious odors. However, it is not a defense to a private nuisance action
that many members of the public or many other property owners have
suffered the same kind and degree of damages. "'
Public Trust Doctrine
Enforcement of the public'trust is another common law theory under
which a waste discharger can bring suit to protect the assimilative capacity
of watercourses. The theory has gained considerable attention in the past
two decades, principally as a means to protect instream uses of water-
courses by the public." 6
Not all states recognize the public trust. The states expressly recog-
nizing the public trust mostly have been riparian doctrine states. " 7 A few
City of Collinsville v. Brickey, 115 Okla. 264, 242 P. 249 (1925); Pennsylvania R.R. v. Sagamore
Coal Co., 281 Pa. 233, 126 A. 386 (1924); Meiners v. Frederick Miller Brewing Co., 78 Wis. 364,
47 N.W. 430 (1890). See Davis, supra note 102, at 750-51.
112. Davis, supra note 102, at 751, 806.
113. Meiners v. Frederick Miller Brewing Co., 78 Wis. 364, 47 N.W. 430 (1890).
114. Bair v. Central & So. Fla. Flood Control Dist., 144 So.2d 818 (Fla. 1962); Smith v. City
of Sedalia, 152 Mo. 283, 53 S.W. 907 (1899); Bouquet v. Hackensack Water Co., 90 N.J.L. 203,
101 A. 379 (1917); Columbia River Fishermen's Protective Union v. City of St. Helens, 160 Ore.
654, 87 P.2d 195 (1939).
115. Ozark Poultry Prod., Inc. v. Garman, 251 Ark. 389, 472 S.W.2d 714 (1971); Urie v.
Franconia Paper Corp., 107 N.H. 131, 218 A.2d 360 (1966).
116. See generally, W. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 170-86 (3d ed. 1977, Supp. 1984);
Ausness, Water Rights, The Public Trust Doctrine, and the Protection of Instream Uses, 1986 U.
ILL. L. REV. 407 (1986); Walston, The Public Trust Doctrine in the Water Rights Context: The Wrong
Environmental Remedy, 22 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 63 (1982); Johnson, Public Trust Protection for
Stream Flows and Lake Levels, 14 U.C. DAVis L. REV. 233 (1980); Comment, State Citizen Rights
Respecting Greatwater Resource Allocation: From Rome to New Jersey, 25 RUTGERS L. REV. 571
(1971) [hereinafter Greatwater Resource Allocation]; Sax, The Public Trust in Natural Resources
Law: Effective Judicial Intervention, 68 MICH. L. REV. 471 (1970). Cf. Comment, The Public Trust
in Tidal Areas: A Sometime Submerged Traditional Doctrine, 79 YALE L.J. 762 (1970) [hereinafter
Tidal Areas].
117. Eastern riparian states acknowledging the existence of the public trust include: Illinois,
Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, Wisconsin. People ex rel. Scott v. Chicago Park Dist., 66 lll.2d 65, 360 N.E.2d 773
(1976); Gulf Oil Corp. v. State Mineral Bd., 317 So.2d 576 (La. 1975); Wicks v. Howard, 40
Md.App. 135, 388 A.2d 1250 (1978); Kerpelman v. Maryland Bd. of Public Works, 261 Md. 436,
276 A.2d 56 (1971), cert. denied 404 U.S. 858 (1971); Sacco v. Department of Public Works, 352
Mass. 670, 227 N.E.2d 478 (1967); Superior Public Rights, Inc. v. State Dp't of Natural Resources,
80 Mich.App. 72, 263 N.W.2d 290 (1978); State v. Kuluvar, 266 Minn. 408, 123 N.W.2d 699
(1963); International Paper Co. v. Mississippi State Highway Dep't, 271 So.2d 395 (Miss. 1972),
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states recognize the public trust statutorily."' Recently courts in some
prior appropriation doctrine states have indicated that the public trust may
exist in the west as well." 9 Its common law antecedents' and its appli-
cation to the American states by Illinois Central R.R. v. Illinois2' suggest
cert. denied 414 U.S. 827 (1973); State Dep't of Environmental Protection v. Jersey Cent. Power
& Light Co., 125 N.J. Super. 97, 308 A.2d 671 (1973); Texas Eastern Transmission Corp. v. Wildlife
Preserves, Inc., 48 N.J. 261, 225 A.2d 130 (1966); People of the Town of Smithtown v. Poveromo,
71 Misc.2d 524, 336 N.Y.S.2d 764 (Dist. Ct. 1972); New York State Water Resources Bd. v.
Liberman, 37 A.D,2d 484, 326 N.Y.S.2d 284 (1971); Thomas v. Sanders, 65 Ohio App.2d 5, 19
Ohio Op.3d 3,413 N.E.2d 1224 (1979); Payne v. Kassab, I I Pa. Cmwlth. 14, 312 A.2d 86 (1973),
aff-d 468 Pa. 226, 361 A.2d 263 (1976); Jackovny v. Powel, 67 R.I. 218, 21 A.2d 554 (1941);
Wisconsin's Envtl. Decade, Inc. v. Dep't of Natural Resources, 85 Wis.2d 518, 271 N.W2d 69
(1978); State v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 275 Wis. 112, 81 N.W.2d 71 (1957).
One state found the origin of the public trust in the free navigation clause of the Northwest
Ordinance of 1787, art. IV, I Stat. 52 (1789). Muench v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 261 Wis. 492, 53
N.W.2d 514, 55 N.W.2d 40 (1952). Cf. Elder v. Delcour, 364 Mo. 835, 269 S.W.2d 17 (1954).
118. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 38, §435 (1987 & Supp. Pampl.); Mica. COMp. L. ANN. § 691.1202
(1987), MicH. STAT. ANN. § 14.528(202) (1980 & 1987 Supp.); PA. CONST. art. 1, §27; TENN.
CODE ANN. §69-3-102(a) (1987).
119. Western prior appropriation states are: California, Idaho, Montana, North Dakota, Utah,
Washington. National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 33 Cal.3d 419, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, 658
P.2d 709 (1983), cert. denied 464 U.S. 977 (1983); City of Berkeley v. Superior Court, 26 Cal.3d
515, 162 Cal. Rptr. 327, 606 P.2d 362 (1980); Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal.3d 251, 491 P.2d 374
(1971); Colberg, Inc. v. State ex rel. Dep't of Public Works, 67 Cal.2d 408, 62 Cal. Rptr. 401,
432 P.2d 3 (1967); Bohn v. Albertson, 107 Cal.App.2d 738, 238 P.2d 128 (1951); Kootenai Envi-
ronmental Alliance, Inc. v. Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc., 671 P.2d 1085 (Idaho 1983); Northern Pac.
Ry. v. Hirzel, 2 Idaho 438, 161 P. 854 (1916); Montana Coalition for Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran,
682 P.2d 163 (Mont. 1983); North Dakota State Water Comm'n v. Board of Managers, Cavalier
County Water Resource Dist., 332 N.W.2d 254 (N.D. 1983); United Plainsman Ass'n v. North
Dakota State Water Conservation Comm'n, 247 N.W.2d 457 (N.D. 1976); J.J.N.P. Co. v. State ex
rel. Div'n of Wildlife Resources, 655 P.2d 1133 (Utah 1982); Wilbour v. Gallagher, 77 Wash.2d
306, 462 P.2d 232 (1969), cert. denied 400 U.S. 878 (1970).
120. The public trust originally was an obligation of the English Crown to protect the public
rights of navigation and fishery. Illinois Central R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 436, 457 (1892);
Martin v. Waddell's Lessee, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 367, 410 (1842) (bed title case). The thirteen original
states succeeded to the public trust obligation after the Revolution. In turn, it passed to the new
states as they were admitted to the Union. Illinois Central, 146 U.S. at 456, quoting Martin v.
Waddell's Lessee, 41 U.S. at 410.
Accord, Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 13-14, 78, 92-94 (Sup. Ct. 1821); National Audubon Soc'y
v. Superior Court, 33 Cal.3d 419, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, 658 P.2d 709, 718 (1983), cert. denied 464
U.S. 977 (1983); Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-by-the-Sea, 61 N.J. 296, 294 A.2d 47, 51-53
(1972); People of the Town of Smithtown v. Poveromo, 71 Misc.2d 524, 336 N.Y.S.2d 764, 769-
72 (Dist. Ct. 1972) (citing Martin); Thomas v. Sanders, 65 Ohio App.2d 5, 19 Ohio Op.3d 3, 413
N.E.2d 1224 (1979); City of Milwaukee v. State, 193 Wis. 423, 214 N.W. 820, 828-29 (1927).
The commentators agree. Ausness, supra note 116, at 409-12; Sax, supra note 116, at 475-77;
Comment, Greatwater Resource Allocation, supra note 116, at 576-643; Comment, Tidal Areas,
supra note 116, at 763-72. See also, Stone, Public Rights in Water Uses and Private Rights in Land
Adjacent to Water, in I WATERS AND WATER RiGfrrs 177, 180-82, 190-202 (R. Clark ed. 1967,
Cumm. Supp. 1978); Davis, State Ownership of Beds of Inland Waters-A Summary and Reex-
amination, 57 NEB. L. REv. 665, 666-68 (1978).
121. 146 U.S. 387 (1892). That landmark decision held (1) that the beds of navigable waters are
held by the state in trust for the public, (2) that the states have an obligation, as trustees, to preserve
navigable waters for use by the public, and (3) that the state cannot abdicate that obligation by
conveyance of the bed of a navigable water to private interests in derogation of the interests of the
public. Id. at 452-53, 455, 456.
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strongly that the public trust doctrine ought to exist in and be recognized
by all common law states. States recognizing the trust have extended it
to all waters navigable under state law,'22 not just those navigable under
federal law.'23
The public trust doctrine imposes an obligation on the states, as trustees,
to preserve navigable waters for use by the public. 24 At a minimum, a
state may not affirmatively act in derogation of the trust. For example,
the doctrine prohibits the state from filling a bed or draining a marsh for
non-water resource uses. '25 Additionally, it empowers a state to regulate
obstructions to navigation'26 and to protect the public rights of navigation
122. Hayes v. State, 254 Ark. 680, 496 S.W.2d 372 (1973); Thomas v. Sanders, 65 Ohio App.2d
5, 19 Ohio Op.3d 3, 413 N.E.2d 1224 (1979); Muench v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 261 Wis. 492, 53
N.W.2d 514, 55 N.W.2d 40 (1952).
Many states have adopted a navigability definition for public rights purposes similar to the federal
commercial navigability definition. E.g., People v. Emmert, 198 Colo. 137, 597 P.2d 1025 (1979);
Baker v. State ex rel. Jones, 87 So.2d 497 (Fla. 1956); Lakeside Park Co. v. Forsmark, 396 Pa.
389, 153 A.2d 486 (1959).
Other states have enlarged the definition of navigable waters to those waters capable of floating
sawlogs, railroad ties and recreational boats. People ex rel. Baker v. Mack, 19 Cal.App.3d 1040,
97 Cal. Rptr. 448 (1971); Southern Idaho Fish & Game Ass'n v. Picabo Livestock, Inc., 96 Idaho
360, 528 P.2d 1295 (1974); Kelly ex rel. MacMullen v. Hallden, 51 Mich.App. 176, 214 N.W.2d
856 (1974); Elder v. Delcour, 364 Mo. 835, 269 S.W.2d 17 (1954); State v. Red River Valley Co.,
51 N.M. 207, 182 P.2d 421 (1945); People v. Kraemer, 7 Misc.2d 373, 164 N.Y.S.2d 423 (Pol.
Ct. 1957); Curry v. Hill, 460 P.2d 933 (Okla. 1969); Luscher v. Reynolds, 153 Ore. 625, 56 P.2d
1158 (1936); Hillebrand v. Knapp, 65 S.D. 414, 274 N.W. 821 (1937); Day v. Armstrong, 362
P.2d 137 (Wyo. 1971).
On state definitions of navigability, see generally, Ausness, supra note 116, at 433-34; Stone,
supra note 120, at 214-17; Johnson & Austin, Recreational Rights and Titles to Beds on Western
Lakes and Streams, 7 NAT. REs. J. 1, 33-52 (1967). Cf. P. Davis, State Ownership of Beds of Inland
Waters-A Summary and Reexamination, 57 NEa. L. REv. 665, 674-76 nn.50-51, 680-81 nn.68-
71, 699-700 n.152 (1978).
123. Under Illinois Central, the public trust extended to waters navigable under federal law at
the time the state was admitted to the Union. Illinois Central R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 435-
36 (1892). Accord, Utah v. United States, 403 U.S. 9, 10 (1971); United States v. Oregon, 295
U.S. 1, 14 (1935); United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64, 75 (1931).
124. Illinois Central R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387,453 (1892). Accord, National Audubon Soc'y
v. Superior Court, 33 Cal.3d 419, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, 658 P.2d 709, 719 (1983), cert. denied 464
U.S. 977 (1983); Kootenai Environmental Alliance, Inc. v. Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc., 671 P.2d
1085 (Idaho 1983); People ex rel. Scott v. Chicago Park Dist., 66 l1.2d 65, 360 N.E.2d 773, 777-
78 (1976); Wicks v. Howard, 40 Md.App. 135, 388 A.2d 1250 (1978); Sacco v. Department of
Public Works, 352 Mass. 670, 227 N.E.2d 478, 479 (1967); People ex rel. MacMullan v. Babcock,
38 Mich. App. 336, 196 N.W.2d 489, 497 (1972); Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. I, 71 (Sup. Ct.
1821); New York State Water Resources Bd. v. Liberman, 37 A.D.2d 484, 326 N.Y.S.2d 284, 288
(1971); United Plainsman Ass'n v. North Dakota State Water Conservation Comm'n, 247 N.W.2d
457, 461 (N.D. 1976); Muench v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 261 Wis. 492, 53 N.W.2d 514, 517-18
(1952).
125. City of Berkeley v. Superior Court, 26 Cal.3d 515, 162 Cal. Rptr. 327, 606 P.2d 362 (1980);
Sacco v. Dep't of Public Works, 352 Mass. 670, 227 N.E.2d 478 (1967); In re Crawford County
Levee & Drainage Dist., 182 Wis. 404, 196 N.W. 874 (1924); Priewe v. Wisconsin State Land &
Imp. Co., 93 Wis. 534, 67 N.W. 918 (1896).
126. People ex rel. Scott v. Chicago Park Dist., 66 1ll.2d 65, 360 N.E.2d 773 (1976); People
ex rel. MacMullan v. Babcock, 38 Mich. App. 336, 196 N.W.2d 489 (1972); New York State Water
Resources Bd. v. Liberman, 37 A.D.2d 484, 326 N.Y.S.2d 284 (1971); Thomas v. Sanders, 65
Ohio App.2d 5, 19 Ohio Op.3d 3,413 N.E.2d 1224 (1979); Town of Ashwaubnon v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 22 Wis. 2d 38, 125 N.W.2d 647 (1963), 126 N.W.2d 567 (1964).
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recreation and fishing. 27 It also requires the state to identify impacts upon
public trust waters as part of a planning process."'2 Finally, some courts
go beyond merely prohibiting the state from acting in derogation of trust
purposes and require the state affirmatively to regulate state navigable
waters for the benefit of the public's right to use those waters."
The public trust doctrine forbids the state from ignoring its obligation
to protect the waters and streambeds which constitute the corpus of the
trust.' The state may not abdicate its obligation by conveyance of the
trust corpus to private interests.' 3 ' While the state cannot destroy or allow
destruction of the trust corpus,' 32 it may select among various water-
related trust purposes.' 33
127. Bohn v. Albertson, 107 Cal.App.2d 738, 238 P.2d 128 (1951); Procter v. Wells, 103 Mass.
216 (1869); Nelson v. De Long, 213 Minn. 425, 7 N.W.2d 342 (1942); Montana Coalition for
Stream Access, Inc. v. Curran, 682 P.2d 163 (Mont. 1983); Matthews v. Bay Head Imp. Ass'n, 95
N.J. 306, 471 A.2d 355 (1984); North Dakota State Water Comm'n v. Board of Managers, Cavalier
County Water Resource Dist., 332 N.W.2d 254 (N.D. 1983); Jackovny v. Powel, 67 R.I. 218, 21
A.2d 554 (1941); J.J.N.P. Co. v. State ex rel. Div'n of Wildlife Resources, 655 P.2d 1133 (Utah
1982); Muench v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 261 Wis. 492, 53 N.W.2d 514, affd 55 N.W.2d 40 (1952).
128. United Plainsmen Ass'n v. North Dakota State Water Conservation Comm'n, 247 N.W.2d
457 (N.D. 1976).
129. Muench v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 261 Wis. 492, 53 N.W.2d 514, affd 55 N.W.2d 40
(1952).
130. Kootenai Environmental Alliance, Inc. v. Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc., 671 P.2d 1085 (Idaho
1983); Newburyport Redevelopment Authority v. Commonwealth, 9 Mass.App. 206, 401 N.E.2d
118 (1980) (dictum); United Plainsman Ass'n v. North Dakota State Water Conservation Comm'n,
247 N.W.2d 457, 461 (N.D. 1976); Muench v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 261 Wis. 492, 53 N.W.2d
514, aff-d 55 N.W.2d 40 (1952).
131. Illinois Central R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453, 455, 456 (1892), quoting Arnold v.
Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 78 (1821). Accord, National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 33 Cal.3d 419,
189 Cal. Rptr. 346, 658 P.2d 709, 721-23 (1983), cert. denied 464 U.S. 977 (1983); People ex rel.
Scott v. Chicago Park Dist., 66 1l1.2d 65, 360 N.E.2d 773, 778-81 (1976); Sacco v. Dep't of Public
Works, 352 Mass. 670, 227 N.E.2d 478, 479-80 (1967) (dictum); Neptune City v. Borough of Avon-
by-the-Sea, 61 N.J. 296, 294 A.2d 47, 53-55 (1972); People of the Town of Smithtown v. Poveromo,
71 Misc.2d 524, 336 N.Y.S.2d 764, 774 (Dist. Ct. 1972); Illinois Steel Co. v. Bilot, 109 Wis. 418,
84 N.W. 855, 857, 85 N.W. 402 (1901).
132. People ex rel. MacMullan v. Babcock, 38 Mich. App. 336, 196 N.W.2d 489 (1972); In re
Crawford County Levee & Drainage Dist., 182 Wis. 404, 196 N.W. 874 (1924).
The public trust may be exercised only to further trust purposes and not for other public purposes
unrelated to water. City of Berkeley v. Superior Court, 26 Cal.3d 515, 162 Cal. Rptr. 327, 606
P.2d 362 (1980); Kootenai Environmental Alliance, Inc. v. Panhandle Yacht Club, Inc., 671 P.2d
1085 (Idaho 1983); Gulf Oil Corp. v. State Mineral Bd., 317 So.2d 576 (La. 1975); Sacco v. Dep't
of Public Works, 352 Mass. 670, 227 N.E.2d 478 (1967); International Paper Co. v. Mississippi
State Highway Dep't, 271 So.2d 395 (Miss. 1972), cert. denied 414 U.S. 827 (1973); Texas Eastern
Transmission Corp. v. Wildlife Preserves, Inc., 48 N.J. 261, 225 A.2d 130 (1966); State v. Public
Service Comm'n, 275 Wis. 112, 81 N.W.2d 71 (1957).
133. Colberg, Inc. v. State, 67 Cal.2d 408, 62 Cal. Rptr. 401, 432 P,2d 3 (1967); State v. Public
Serv. Comm'n, 275 Wis. 112, 81 N.W.2d 71 (1956); Town of Ashwaubenon v. Public Serv. Comm'n,
22 Wis.2d 38, 125 N.W.2d 647 (1963).
However, courts in some states permit balancing between water-related public trust interests and
other public interests. Superior Public Rights, Inc. v. State Dp't of Natural Resources, 80 Mich.
App. 72, 263 N.W.2d 290 (1978). Such balancing includes an obligation to mitigate adverse effects.
Payne v. Kassab, II Pa. Cmwlth. 14, 312 A.2d 86 (1973), aft'd468 Pa. 226, 361 A.2d 263 (1976).
Although cast as a public nuisance action, Rodgers argues that Payne functionally adopts public
trust concepts. RoDGe.s, ENVIRONMENrAL LAW 177 (1977 & 1984 Supp.).
Spring 19881
NATURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL
Clearly, the state, as public trustee, has standing to enforce the public
trust.'" It is not so clear whether members of the public, as beneficiaries
of the trust, can do so. Some courts have held that members of the public
can sue the state if it regulates water uses in derogation of the public
trust or abdicates its trust obligations.' 35 In some states, a member of the
public can enforce public trust rights directly against a violator."36 In other
states, however, a private individual cannot enforce the trust. 37
Protection of Assimilative Capacity
In theory, the public trust doctrine ought to be available to protect both
a minimum protected flow for waste assimilative capacity and ambient
water quality. Two cases have addressed that question tangentially.
In Hazen v. Perkins, 3' the public trust doctrine was asserted in an
attempt to declare unlawful a dam spillway gate designed to raise the
water level of a natural lake in order to create a millpond. The court held
that the lake was boatable and, therefore, was subject to the public trust,
and that the state as public trustee had no power to authorize private
persons to raise the level of the lake. 39 Treating the operation of the dam
spillway gate as a public nuisance, the court ruled that private plaintiffs
must show special damage. It refused to grant injunctive relief because
plaintiffs could not distinguish damage to the shoreline caused by natural
lake level variation and by ariificial variation resulting from defendant's
operation of the dam spillway gate."
A public trust cause of action was recognized recently in National
Audubon Society v. Superior Court,'4' where plaintiffs were seeking to
enjoin water diversions in order to protect wildlife habitat. The intercep-
tion of streams feeding Mono Lake in California and diversion of their
134. Maryland v. Amerada Hess, 350 F.Supp. 1060 (D. Md. 1972); Kerpelman v. Maryland Bd.
of Public Works, 261 Md. 436, 276 A.2d 56 (1971), cert. denied 404 U.S. 858 (1971); State Dep't
of Envt'l Protection v. Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co., 125 N.J. Super. 97, 308 A.2d 671 (1973);
State v. Bishop, 75 Misc.2d 787, 348 N.Y.S.2d 999 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1973); Wilbour v. Gallagher,
77 Wash.2d 306, 462 P.2d 232 (1969), cert. denied 400 U.S. 878 (1970); State v. Deetz, 66 Wis.2d
201, 224 N.W.2d 407 (1974).
135. Marks v. Whitney, 6 Cal.3d 251, 98 Cal. Rptr. 790, 491 P.2d 374 (1971); Wisconsin's
Envt'l Decade, Inc. v. Dep't of Natural Resources, 85 Wis.2d 518, 271 N.W.2d 69 (1978); Muench
v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 261 Wis. 492, 53 N.W.2d 514, 55 N.W.2d 40 (1952). See Gould v.
Greylock Reservation Comm'n, 350 Mass. 410, 215 N.E.2d 114 (1966).
136. MIcH. COMP. L. ANN. § 691.1202 (1987), Mien. STAT. ANN. § 14.528(202) (1980 & 1987
Supp.).
137. Kerpelman v. Maryland Bd. of Public Works, 261 Md. 436, 276 A.2d 56 (1971), cert.
denied 404 U.S. 858 (1971).
138. 92 Vt. 414, 105 A. 249 (1918).
139. Id., 105 A. at 251.
140. Id., 105 A. at 251-52.
141. 33 Cal. 3d 419, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, 658 P.2d 709 (1983) (no decision on the merits), cert.
denied 464 U.S. 977 (1983).
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waters to Los Angeles for public water supply caused a substantial reduc-
tion in the lake level and surface area, threatening disruption of a gull
rookery. Plaintiffs brought suit to restore the scenic and ecological values
of the lake, asserting that the diversion, authorized by a state prior appro-
priation permit, violated the public trust obligations of the state. 42 After
reviewing the origins of the public trust doctrine,'43 the court reconfirmed
its prior recognition of the doctrine,'" but held that the public trust did
not have a superior status to water diversion rights established under prior
appropriation law. 45 Instead, the court ruled that the state must balance
instream needs under the public trust doctrine with the need for water
diversions." It held that prior appropriation diversion rights had been
granted to Los Angeles without consideration of instream needs and that
the impact of the diversion on Mono Lake must be reconsidered by some
responsible agency. 47
Hazen and National Audubon are examples of the applicability of the
public trust doctrine in protecting lake levels. By analogy, the doctrine
ought to apply also to protect minimum flows, since flows and levels are
hydraulically interrelated. Nonetheless, the public trust doctrine has never
been asserted as an independent basis for water quality regulation or for
protecting the assimilative capacity of a watercourse.'"
Relation to Water Diversion Rights
The public trust doctrine suggests that its exercise ought to preempt
any private diversion rights. Because the public trust originated as a
sovereign obligation to protect the public rights of navigation and fishery,
the trust obligations antedate and preempt later created diversion rights. '49
Hence, the states ought not to be able to create private water rights free
of possible exercise of the public trust. "0
Mono Lake Case. The California Supreme Court has misinterpreted
the relationship between the public trust doctrine and water diversion
rights. National Audubon,'"just discussed, expressly required the inte-
gration of the previously separate prior appropriation and public trust
142. Id., 189 Cal. Rptr. 348-49, 658 P.2d at 711-12.
143. Id., 189 Cal. Rptr. at 355-57, 658 P.2d at 718-20.
144. Id., 189 Cal. Rptr. at 357-61, 658 P.2d at 720-24.
145. Id.- 189 Cal. Rptr. at 363-64, 658 P.2d at 726-27.
146. Id., 189 Cal. Rptr. at 364-65, 658 P.2d at 727-28.
147. id., 189 Cal. Rptr. at 365-66, 658 P.2d at 728-29.
148. But cf. People v. Gold Run Dredging & Mining Co., 66 Cal. 138, 4 P. 1152 (1884) (siltation
from hydraulic mining enjoined).
149. See supra note 121.
150. Except in National Audubon.
151. National Audubon Soc'y v. Superior Court, 33 Cal. 3d 419, 189 Cal. Rptr. 346, 658 P.2d
709 (1983) (no decision on the merits), cert. denied 464 U.S. 977 (1983).
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doctrines. 5 2 The prior appropriation permit system was held to be one
component of a statutory system for allocating water for the relative
benefit of all water uses. 153 Hence, according to the court, a decision to
allow diversion of a substantial portion of a watercourse to the detriment
of instream wildlife habitat uses might not be in derogation of the state's
public trust obligations, provided the interests of the trust are considered
and balanced. 54 The effect of National Audubon is to abandon the core
concepts of the public trust doctrine that all private water rights are junior
and subordinate to the public trust, and that the state is forbidden to
abdicate its obligations as public trustee in favor of those junior private
water rights.
Regulatory cases. Regulatory permit cases relying on the police power
alone have held that refusal to grant dam and wetland fill permits in order
to preserve natural flow for habitat and recreation purposes cannot be
challenged successfully by the disappointed applicant. 55 Those cases
apparently presume that the granting of a diversion or dam permit is a
privilege, so that permit denial on public policy grounds does not con-
stitute a taking.'56 There can be no taking when a state-owned dominant
152. Id., 189 Cal. Rptr. at 369, 658 P.2d at 732.
153. Id., 189 Cal. Rptr. at 364-65, 658 P.2d at 727-28.
154. Id., 189 Cal. Rptr.
155. Claridge v. New Hampshire Wetlands Bd., 125 N.H. 745,485 A.2d 287 (1984); Application
of Hemco, 129 Vt. 517, 283 A.2d 246 (1971) (hydro dam permit application). Cf. Zabel v. Tabb,
430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970) (swamp filling permit application); Namekagon Hydro Co. v. Federal
Power Comm'n, 216 F.2d 509 (7th Cir. 1954) (hydro dam permit application).
Another case held compensation need not be paid because there was no diminution in value of a
swamp because a fill permit had been denied. Just v. Marinette County, 56 Wis.2d 7, 201 N.W.2d
761 (1972). But that approach has not been followed in most open space and floodplain zoning
cases, which grant compensation when the market value of the regulated land has been reduced too
much. E.g., Mortis County Land Imp. Co. v. Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 40 N.J. 539, 193
A.2d 232 (1963). Compensation need not be paid when some reasonable portion of former market
value is retained after the regulation is imposed. E.g., Maple Leaf Inv., Inc. v. State Dep't of
Ecology, 88 Wash.2d 726. 565 P.2d 1162 (1977). For an extensive analysis of the "taking" issue
in open space and floodplain zoning cases, see KUSLER, REGULATION OF FLOOD HAZARD AREAS, ch.
4 (1971). Recently, the U.S. Supreme Court required payment of temporary taking damages where
an overrestrictive floodplain regulation is imposed for a short period of time. First English Evangelical
Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County, 107 S.Ct. 2378 (1987).
156. But see Florida Rock Indus., Inc. v. United States, 791 F.2d 893 (Fed. Cir. 1986), cert.
denied 107 S.Ct. 926 (1987), affirming in part 8 Ct.CI. 160 (1985), where an owner of a swamp
was denied a Clean Water Act §404 (33 U.S.C. § 1344) (1982) wetlands permit for surface mining
in a swamp. The court held that if the owner were prevented from making any viable economic use
of the swamp, the permit denial would constitute a compensable regulatory taking. It rejected the
federal agency's contention that the permit can be denied without compensation in order to promote
the public's right to continued enjoyment of the environmental and aesthetic values inherent in the
unaltered wetland. It rejected also the contention that the public's right was a servitude on private
title. For the proposition that the navigation servitude is no longer available to excuse uncompensated
regulatory takings, the court relied on Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979), although
in the latter case may instead be characterized either as involving a taking of the right to exclude
the public from privately-owned abutting shoreland rather than as a regulatory taking, or as involving
nonnavigable waters to which the navigation servitude does not apply. See Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S.
at 178-80.
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right is exercised in derogation of a private subordinate right. 57 Since
private streambed titles and water use rights are subordinate to the public
trust,"' it is appropriate that denial of a permit on public trust grounds
should not constitute a taking.
STATUTORY REMEDIES
State legislation in recent years has created two potential non-common
law remedies for protecting waste assimilation streamflows. One requires
formal analysis of environmental effects before beginning state and local
government projects or issuing permits for private projects. The other
establishes substantive environmental rights in the public.
Environmental Policy Statutes
Many states have enacted legislation paralleling the National Environ-
mental Policy Act of 1970 (NEPA).' 59 Those state acts"W generally are
identical to NEPA or are very similar. 6 ' As a result, state courts have
tended to rely on the federal courts' interpretation of NEPA.' 6
Recently, the United States Supreme Court approved of and used the same "denial of all economic
use" test in finding a temporary taking by a ban on reconstruction of structures in a floodplain. First
English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles County, 107 S.Ct. 2378 (1987).
If denial of all economic use of a wetland is a regulatory taking under the navigation servitude,
then it may be also under the public trust. Florida Rock could be interpreted as rejecting the notion
that public use rights protected by the public trust doctrine can justify permit denial without com-
pensation as a servitude on private title. Such an interpretation would run counter to the teachings
of the cases cited in supra note 155, which expressly allow dam and wetland permit denials to
preserve natural waters and swamps.
157. By analogy to the law of easements.
158. Because the public trust doctrine was imposed from the beginning of sovereignty in the
colonies, private water rights and streambed titles necessarily were created later and were subject
to the inalienable public trust obligation of the sovereign. On the historical origins of the public
trust doctrine, see supra note 120 and Illinois Central R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 435-36, 456-
57.
159. 42 U.S.C. § 4321-4370 (1982). See generally, I S. NOvICK, D. STEVER & M. MELLON, LAW
OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, ch.9 (1987); D. MANDELKER, NEPA LAW AND LITIGATION (1984
& 1986 Supp.); W. RODGERS, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW (1977).
160. CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§21000-174 (West 1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 22a-I to -lh (West
1984); HAW. REV. STAT. §343-18 (1985); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 13-1-10-1 to -8 (Bums 1987); MD.
NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 1-301 to -305 (1983); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN., ch.30, §§61-62H (West
1979); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 116D.01-.07 (West 1987); MONT. CODE ANN. §§75-1-t0l to -105, -
.201 (1987); N.Y. ENvT'L CONSERV. LAW §§8-0101 to -0117 (McKinney 1984); N.C. GFN. STAT.
§ 113A-1 to -10 (1983); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§34A-9-1 to -12 (1986); VA. CODE ANN.
§§ 10.17-107 to -112 (1985); WASH. REv. CODEANN. §§43.21C.010-.910(1983); WiS. STAT. ANN.
§ 1. 11 (West 1986).
See generally, D. MANDELKER, supra note 159, ch. 12; W. RODGERS, supra note 159, at 809-22.
161. D. MANDELKER, supra note 159, at 12-3; W. RODGERS, supra note 159, at 811.
162. D. MANDELKER, supra note 159, at 12-2.
Some state courts have expressly looked to federal interpretations of NEPA for guidance. Friends
of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors of Mono County, 8 Cal.3d 247, 104 Cal. Rptr. 761, 502 P.2d
1049, 1057-59 (1972); Eastlake Community Council v. Roanoke Assn, Inc., 82 Wash.2d 475, 513
P.2d 36 (1974); Wisconsin's Envt'l Decade, Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 69 Wis.2d 1, 230 N.W.2d
243 (1975).
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State environmental policy acts require the state government (and often
local governments) to prepare an Environmental Impact Report (EIR)
before it makes a decision on a state project or any major state action.'63
Major state actions include inter alia state projects and licensing of private
or municipal projects' which may have significant environmental effects.'"
Water resources projects and projects discharging wastes are subject to
the EIR preparation requirement."6
The EIR must include analyses of specified issues, typically including:
(1) the environmental impact of the proposed action;
(2) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided should
the proposal be implemented;
(3) alternatives to the proposed action;
(4) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's environ-
ment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term produc-
tivity; and
(5) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of resources which
would be involved in the proposed action should it be imple-
mented. 167
163. State acts: Friends of Mammoth v. Mono County, 8 Cal.3d 247, 502 P.2d 1049, 104 Cal.
Rptr. 761 (1972); Eastlake Community Council v. Roanoke Assn, Inc., 82 Wash.2d 475, 513 P.2d
36 (1974). See generally, D. MANDELKER, supra note 159, at § 12:10; W. RODGERS, supra note 159,
at 811-16.
NEPA: Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm'n v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C.
Cir. 1971). On the "timing" issue, see generally, D. MANDELKER, supra note 159, at 8-26 to -39;
W. RODGERS, supra note 19, at 767-74.
164. State acts: Friends of Mammoth v. Mono County, 8 Cal.3d 247, 104 Cal. Rptr. 761, 502
P.2d 1049 (1972); Sisley v. San Juan County, 89 Wash.2d 78, 569 P.2d 712 (1977).
NEPA: Major federal actions are those which involve substantial time, resources or expenditure
for planning, involve controversy or significant environmental consequences, or involve projects of
significant size, scope or investment. Hanly v. Kleindienst 1I, 471 F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Grant, 341 F.Supp. 356
(E.D.N.C. 1972). See CEQ Guidelines, 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27 (1987). See generally, S. NOVICK, D.
STEVER & M. MELLON, supra note 159, at 9-12 to -14; D. MANDELKER, supra note 159, at 8-79 to -
82; W. RODGERS, supra note 159, at 750-61.
165. State acts: No Oil, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 13 Cal.3d 68, 118 Cal. Rptr. 34, 529 P.2d
66 (1975); Manchester Environmental Coalition v. Stockton, 184 Conn. 51, 441 A.2d 68 (1981);
Secretary of Envt'l Affairs v. Massachusetts Port Auth., 366 Mass. 755, 323 N.E.2d 329 (1975);
HOMES v. New York State Urban Dev. Corp., 69 A.D.2d 222, 418 N.Y.S.2d 827 (1979); Marino
Property Co. v. Port of Seattle, 88 Wash.2d 822, 567 P.2d 1125 (1977); Wisconsin's Envt'l Decade,
Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 79 Wis.2d 409, 256 N.W.2d 149 (1977). On the state act threshold
for "significance," which appears to be lower than under NEPA, see D. MANDELKER, supra note
159, at 12-14.
NEPA requires "significance" as a prerequisite for EIS preparation. Hanly v. Kleindienst II, 471
F.2d 823 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 908 (1973). See generally, S. NOVICK, D. STEVER
& M. MELLON, supra note 159, at 9-14 to -16; D. MANDELKER, supra note 159, at 8-82 to -84. W.
RODGERS, supra note 159, at 750-61.
166. State acts: Envt'l Defense Fund, Inc. v. Coastside County Water Dist., 27 CaI.App.3d 695,
104 Cal. Rptr. 197 (1972).
NEPA: See Anderson, The National Environmental Policy Act, in FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
238, 343 (E. Dolgin & T. Guilbert, eds., 1974).
167. State acts: CAL. PuB. RES. CODE §§ 21002.1, 21100 (West 1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§22a-Ib (West 1987); IND. CODE ANN. § 13-1-10-3 (Bums 1987); MD. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § I-
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The EIR must contain reasonably adequate discussions of these and other
relevant environmental issues.' No final agency decision can be made
before the EIR is prepared and considered."6 The EIR can be the basis
for project or licensing denial,' 70
The state environmental policy acts, like NEPA, are enforceable by
any person who has an "interest" in the agency decision. Such persons
are. users who would be affected by the project and can show an injury
in fact."'7 The environmental effect might have economic impact" or the
affected person might be unable to enjoy or use the area where the project
is to be located should it proceed.'73 Unlike NEPA, however, some state
statutes also grant standing to any citizen claiming harm to the environ-
ment. 74
304 (1983); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN., ch.30, §62B (West 1979); MINN. STAT. ANN. § I 16D.04(2a)
(West 1987); MoNT. CODE ANN. § 75-1-201(1)(b) (1987); N.Y. ENVT'L CONSERV. LAW § 8-0109(2)
(McKinney 1984); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 113A-4(2) (1983); P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 12, § 1124(c); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS §34A-9-7 (1986); VA. CODE § 10.17.108 (1985); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 43.21C.030(c); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 1.1 1(2)(c) (West 1986). See generally, W. RODGERS, supra
note 159, at 817-18 (1983).
NEPA: § 102(C); 42 U.S.C. §4332(C) (1982).
168. State acts: Life of the Land v. Ariyoshi, 59 Haw. 156, 577 P.2d 1116 (1978); No Power
Line, Inc. v. Minnesota Envt'l Quality Council, 262 N.W.2d 312 (Minn. 1977); Warren County v.
North Carolina, 528 F.Supp. 276 (E.D.N.C. 1981); Wisconsin's Envtl. Decade, Inc. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 98 Wis.2d 682, 298 N.W.2d 205 (1980).
NEPA: Sierra Club v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng., 701 F.2d 1011 (2d Cir. 1983). See generally,
D. MANDELKER, supra note 159, ch. 10.
169. State acts: Burger v. County of Mendocino, 45 Cal.App.3d 322, 119 Cal. Rptr. 568 (1975);
Friends of Mammoth v. Mono County, 8 Cal.3d 247, 104 Cal. Rptr. 761, 502 P.2d 1049 (1972);
Leschi Improve Coun. v. Washington State Highway Comm'n, 84 Wash.2d 271, 525 P.2d 774
(1974).
NEPA: Life of the Land v. Brinegar, 485 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1973).
170. State acts: Polygon Corp. v. City of Seattle, 90 Wash.2d 59, 578 P.2d 1309 (1978).
NEPA: Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied 401 U.S. 910 (1971). Cf. Udall
v. Federal Power Comm'n, 387 U.S. 428 (1967).
171. State acts: Orange County v. North Carolina Dep't of Transportation, 46 N.C.App. 350,
265 S.E.2d 890 (1980); Coughlin v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 27 Wash.App. 888, 621 P.2d 183
(1980).
NEPA: Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972); United States v. Students Challenging
Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669, SCRAP 1 (1973); Coalition for the Env't v. Volpe,
504 F.2d 156 (8th Cir. 1974). See generally, S. NovicK, D. STEVER & M. MELLON, supra note 159,
at 9-35 to -36; D. MANDELKER, supra note 159, 4-09.
172. State acts: Bliek v. Town of Webster, 104 Misc.2d 852, 429 N.Y.S.2d 811 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1980).
NEPA: Environmental injury must be shown in addition to economic injury. National Helium
Corp. v. Morton I, 455 F.2d 650 (10th Cir. 1971). Mere economic injury alone does not confer
standing. Benton County Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 450 F.Supp. 884
(W.D. Ark. 1978); Churchill Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 533 F.2d 411 (8th Cir. 1976).
173. State acts: Bozung v. Local Agency Formation Comm'n of Ventura City, 13 Cal.3d 263,
118 Cal. Rptr. 249, 529 P.2d 1017 (1975); Glen Head-Glenwood Landing Civic Council v. Town
of Oyster Bay, 109 Misc.2d 376, 438 N.Y.S.2d 715 (Sup. Ct. 1981); Save a Valuable Environment
v. City of Bothell, 89 Wash.2d 862, 576 P.2d 401 (1978); Wisconsin's Envtl. Decade, Inc. v. Public
Serv. Comm'n, 69 Wis.2d i, 230 N.W.2d 243 (1975).
NEPA: Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972); United States v. SCRAP 1, 412 U.S. 669
(1973).
174. See Manchester Envt'l Coalition v. Stockton, 184 Conn. 51, 441 A.2d 68 (1981); City of
Boston v. Massachusetts Port Auth., 364 Mass. 639, 308 N.E.2d 488 (1974).
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Two interpretative difficulties are presented. First, NEPA has been held
not to mandate any final particular agency decisions favorable to envi-
ronmental values. '75 Many state courts appear to be interpreting the state
acts similarly,'76 but some are requiring state agencies to balance envi-
ronmental values against other decision-making factors and even to incor-
porate feasible mitigation measures into project designs. '77 Second, NEPA
has been interpreted as grafting on to agency legislative mandates a
requirement to consider all relevant environmental issues."h The state
courts now are struggling with the same issue. Most state courts consid-
ering the issue have held similarly to the federal courts' position on
NEPA.' 79
The comprehensive scope of environmental analysis required by these
acts raises the question whether they can be used to require state agencies
to preserve minimum streamflows for waste assimilation in designing and
licensing projects. The answer is not clear. Only one court has considered
whether water quality and pollution issues must be considered under a
state environmental policy act in determining whether to issue a water
diversion permit. That court held that the act requires such consideration.
In Stempel v. Department of Water Resources,'o the state agency con-
sidered a prior appropriation application for diversion of lake water to a
subdivision. Although numerous objections about pollution from return
water were raised during hearings on the application, the agency granted
the application without considering potential water pollution problems.
It argued that the statutory requirement that there be no detriment to
public welfare 8' did not require it to examine potential pollution resulting
from the proposed project. The court held that subsequently enacted
legislation rendered the agency's position nonmeritorious. Because of
enactment of the state environmental policy act, which required prepa-
ration and consideration of an EIR, potential pollution problems did have
175. Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223 (1980); Vermont Yankee
Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978); Kleppe v.
Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390 (1976). See generally, MANDELKER, supra note 159, at 10-24 to -30.
176. Coon Creek Watershed Dist. v. State Envt'l Quality Bd., 315 N.W.2d 604 (Minn. 1982);
Save Our Rural Environment v. Snohomish County, 99 Wash.2d 363, 662 P.2d 816 (1983).
177. CAL. PuB. RES. CoDE § 21081(c) (West 1986), construed in Laurel Hills Homeowners Ass'n
v. City Council of City of Los Angeles, 83 Cal.App.3d 515, 147 Cal. Rptr. 842 (1978); N.Y. ENVT'L
CONSERV. LAW § 8-0109(8) (McKinney 1984), construed in Town of Henrietta v. Dep't of Envt'l.
Conserv., 76 A.D.2d 215, 430 N.Y.S.2d 440 (1980) (dictum).
178. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm'n v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir.
1971).
179. See San Francisco Ecology Ctr. v. City & County of San Francisco, 48 Cal.App.3d 584,
122 Cal. Rptr. 100 (1975); Eastlake Community Council v. Roanoke Ass'n, Inc., 82 Wash.2d 475,
513 P.2d 36 (1974).
180. 82 Wash. 2d 109, 508 P.2d 166 (1973).
181. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §90.03.290 (1962).
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to be examined." 2 Also, enactment of state water resource policy legis-
lation required protection of the natural environment, retention of lakes
and ponds "substantially in their natural condition," and use of all avail-
able and reasonable methods of waste treatment.' 3 The court remanded
the case for agency evaluation of potential pollution problems in drainage
from the subdivision."'
Stempel suggests strongly that other states should follow the federal
lead in requiring comprehensive analysis of water quality and pollution
issues, as well as other environmental issues, in making decisions about
water diversions. Such analysis, however, even though in a public forum,
does not create legal protection of minimum streamflows for waste assim-
ilation if the state agencies can ignore adverse analyses and proceed with
the project or licensing. While experience with NEPA suggests that the
nature of decisionmaking becomes more environmentally sensitive when
Environmental Impact Statements (EIS) are discussed in public,'8 5 the
federal act creates no basis for challenging final federal agency decisions,
however unsound environmentally, once the EIS process is completed
adequately. " If the state environmental policy acts are interpreted as
creating no substantive environmental mandate as well, members of the
public will have no basis for judicially challenging environmentally unsound
final state agency decisions. In those states which require their agencies
to provide for mitigation of adverse environmental effects, however, such
failure may be remedied judicially.
Environmental Rights Statutes
A few states have enacted statutes conferring upon citizens a right to
enforce substantive environmental rights.187 These statutes have been held
to create private rights of action against polluters and others who damage
182. State Environmental Policy Act of 1971, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §43.21C.030(c) (1983).
183. Water Resources Act of 1971, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 90.54.020(3) (Supp. 1987).
184. Stempel v. Dep't of Water Resources, 82 Wash.2d 109, 508 P.2d 166 (1973).
185. Jones v. District of Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency, 499 F.2d 502 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
See D. MANDELKER, supra note 159, ch.l l; S. TAYLOR, MAKING BUREAUCRACIES THINK: THE
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STRATEGY OF ADMINISTRATIVE REFORM (1984); Liroff, NEPA-Where Have
We Been and Where Are We Going?, 46 J. AM. PLANNING ASS'N 154 (1980); Caldwell, Is NEPA
Inherently Self-Defeating?, 9 ENVT'L L. REP. 50001 (1979).
186. See supra note 175.
187. Such statutes include: CONN. GEN. STAT. §22a-14 to -20 (West 1987); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 403.412 (West 1979); IND. CODE ANN. § 13-6- 1- 1 (Bums 1987); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 214,§ 7A (West 1979); MICH. COMP. L. ANN. § 691.1202 (1987), MICH. STAT. ANN. § 14.528(202) (West
1980 & 1987 Supp.); MINN. STAT. §§ 116B.01 to 116B. 13 (1987); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 34A-
10-1 (1986). See also FLA. CONST. art. 11, §7; PA. CONST. art. I, §27; Edye v. State, 393 Mich.
453, 225 N.W.2d I (1975). See generally Gionfriddo, Sealing Pandora's Box; Judicial Doctrines
Restricting Public Trust Citizen Environmental Suits, 13 BOSTON COLLEGE ENVT'L AFF. L. REV.
439 (1986).
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the environment,' and against state agencies to compel them to enforce
environmental statutes and regulations. '89 Some courts have held that such
statutes also require states to enforce substantive policies enhancing envi-
ronmental values.' Such environmental rights statutes are applicable to
the protection of minimum flows for waste assimilation, because
encroachment on such minimum flows would have adverse effects on
water quality.
CONCLUSION
The right of water users to be free from unreasonable degradation of
water quality is more clearly developed than the right of the state to
preserve minimum streamflows for waste assimilation. Water users are
entitled to be free from private nuisances and to enjoin public nuisances
if they have suffered special damage. Riparians in the eastern states are
entitled to discharge wastes to a reasonable extent, subject to the right
of other riparians to be free from unreasonable interferences with the
quality of water they use. Appropriators in the western states also are
entitled to be free from unreasonable interferences with water quality. In
some states, water users, as members of the public, may enforce the
public trust, but the courts have not addressed the extent to which the
public trust entitles users of public waters to adequate water quality.
Finally, all citizens have a right to enforce water pollution control statutes
against violators in those states which have citizen suit provisions, in
those few states with environmental rights statutes, and everywhere under
the federal Clean Water Act.
The states have some ability to regulate the relationship between water
users and waste dischargers. They can tailor the effluent limitations in
waste discharge permits to ensure appropriate water quality in the receiv-
ing waters. Neither the federal nor the state water pollution control stat-
utes, however, empower the regulatory agencies to establish and preserve
minimum flows for assimilation of those residual wastes. The eastern
states with diversion permit statutes generally have authority to establish
minimum protected flows for fish habitat and recreational purposes; those
statutes probably can be used to protect waste assimilation flows as well.
The remaining eastern states have no statutory basis for protecting flows
and must rely on the meager protections of the common laW'.
188. State, ex rel. Powderly v. Erickson, 285 N.W.2d 84 (Minn. 1979).
189. Florida Wildlife Federation v. Dep't of Envt'l Regulation, 390 So.2d 64 (Fla. 1980); Com-
mittee for Sensible Land Use v. Garfield Township, 124 Mich.App. 559, 335 N.W.2d 216 (1983).
190. Ray v. Mason County Drainage Comm'rs, 393 Mich. 294, 224 N.W.2d 883 (1975); In re
Highway U.S. 24 in Bloomfield Tp., Oakland City, 392 Mich. 159, 220 N.W.2d 416 (1974); People
for Environmental Enlightenment & Responsibility, Inc. (PEER) v. Minnesota Environmental Quality
Council, 266 N.W.2d 858 (Minn. 1978).
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Some western states have enacted statutes giving state agencies author-
ity to appropriate or withdraw unappropriated water for various public
purposes. Those statutes may be exercised to protect assimilative capacity.
They apply only to unappropriated water, however, so the state's flow
appropriation would be junior to existing appropriations. Furthermore,
on many streams there is no unappropriated water available.
There are common law means to protect assimilative flows. All states
can obtain injunctions requiring abatement of public nuisances, such as
water pollution posing a public health or safety threat. As public trustee,
states may be able to regulate waste discharges and to establish minimum
protected flows for protecting the useability of public waters. Further-
more, in states with environmental rights statutes, private citizens may
be able to bring lawsuits to obtain similar relief. If National Audubon is
accepted as good law, however, the exercise of state authority to balance
water diversion needs against instream flow needs could not be challenged
successfully on public trust grounds, unless the balance struck were egre-
gious.
Environmental policy acts may deter the states from constructing proj-
ects or issuing permits for private projects which may adversely affect
the integrity of waste assimilative streamflows. Although environmental
impact reporting requirements may not impose any ultimate substantive
impediment to environmentally unsound projects, the public disclosure
and discussion requirements often alter the dimensions of public debate
and accountability. Furthermore, a few of the state acts place an affirm-
ative obligation on the state to balance environmental values with other
factors and to employ mitigation measures. In those states, judicial inter-
vention can go beyond requiring adequate environmental analysis to
enforcing that substantive mandate.
From this summary, we can see that legal protection for the preservation
of water flows for waste assimilation contemplated by the water quality
standards established under water pollution control statutes is haphazard
at best. To remedy this deficiency, most states need to enact statutory
authority for establishing minimum streamflows for waste assimilative
purposes. That could be done by incorporating that authority either into
state water quality control statutes or into water diversion permit statutes.
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